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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the following I will give an account of President Clinton’s steps against the American tobacco 
industry. I will also try to clarify why Bill Clinton became America’s first anti-tobacco president, 
taking into account his character and strategic skills. Influence from staff members and health 
agencies as well as revelations that altered the public view on the tobacco industry will also be 
dealt with. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how the tobacco companies fought back against 
Clinton by means of their political influence. The relationship between the Republican Party and 
the tobacco industry will be given special attention. I will also reflect upon whether regulation of 
tobacco could be in accordance with Republican ideology. In this respect, I will cast a critical eye 
on the effect the entrance of the religious right into the GOP had on the party’s stance on tobacco. 
The tobacco industry’s financial support to the two main political parties and the connection 
between contributions to members of Congress and voting patterns in tobacco issues will also be 
dealt with. I will also examine the effect Clinton’s commitment in the tobacco issue had on the 
Democratic Party. Moreover, I will explain how the tobacco companies tried to sway public 
opinion on tobacco issues by influencing and controlling the media. I will also exemplify how 
tobacco companies sued media outlets which printed or broadcast information that could have a 
detrimental effect on the tobacco industry. After having given a summary of the Clinton scandals, 
I will try to detect possible links between the investigation of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr 
and tobacco interests. Finally, I will try to uncover a possible connection between impeachment-
drive in Congress and tobacco interests. 
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 PRESIDENT CLINTON’S FIGHT AGAINST THE AMERICAN TOBACCO 
INDUSTRY 
 
Bill Clinton was the first American president to take a major confrontation with the American 
tobacco industry. The industry’s political efforts, which have been quite bipartisan, though with a 
slight preference for the laissez-faire traditions of the Republican Party, have been giving it 
protection.1 Clinton's Democratic predecessor, Jimmy Carter, whose political base was almost 
identical with the geographical region of the tobacco industry, was not able or willing to resist 
the pressure from the tobacco manufacturers. According to Richard Klüger, the author of "Ashes 
to Ashes", Jimmy Carter played a hypocritical game on the smoking issue. Carter, reportedly 
sacrificed Joseph Califano, the secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
and the most vocal anti-smoking advocate at the time, for fear of  loosing North Carolina and 
perhaps other Southern states if Califano stayed in office.2  
Califano, who had been told by Carter to give priority to "preventive medicine," started to 
pay attention to the smoking issue at the end of his first year in office. Even though Jimmy Carter 
was an advocate of preventive public health measures, Califano's proposed initiatives against 
smoking fell flat with the president and his staff. Carter was apparently worried about his voter 
base. In August 1978, Carter gave a speech in North Carolina, the heart of "tobacco country." He 
said that he first would have brought Califano, but that he had realized that North Carolina was 
the top tobacco growing state. He boasted "the beautiful quality of your tobacco" and even if 
Carter had lost his heavily smoking father in lung cancer, he pledged to support research "to 
make smoking even safer than it is today". In the autumn of 1978, Carter appeared at a soft ball 
game in Georgia, wearing a cap with the inscription: "Pride in tobacco." In April 1979, Senator 
Edward Kennedy told Califano that he had to resign from the Cabinet well before the 1980 
elections. A few months later President Carter made Califano walk the plank.3  
                                                          
1 Ferguson, Thomas. “Impeachment:The Sequel, Smoke in Starr’s Chamber.” The Nation 
( 8 March. 1999) : 6 pp. Internet. 14 Sept. 1999. 
Http://www.thenation.com/issue/990308/0308ferguson.shtml 
2 Klüger, Richard. “The Tobacco Wars, 1979 Carter sacrifices his Secretary.” Mojo Wire  
2 pp. Internet. 17 Sept. 1999  
Http://bsd.mojones.com/mother_jones/MJ96/tobacco_timeline/.html  
3 Ibid 
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 Nor did Ronald Reagan cause problems for the tobacco industry. On the contrary, many 
of Regan's political actions were beneficial to the tobacco companies. In 1984 Reagan assured 
Edward Horrigan, tobacco chief of R.J.Reynolds that he would have more important things to do 
than taking on tobacco firms (Klüger 540). The deregulatory Reagan administration removed 
heads and reduced the staff of the Federal Trade Commission by one-third. The FTC, commonly 
reputed to be the protector of the consumer, was the superintendent of tobacco sales (Klüger 
535). In 1997, the FTC closed the laboratory it had run for twenty years to supervise the tar and 
nicotine levels of most cigarette brands in order to save $750,000. A tobacco-run laboratory was 
given this task; from then on the hen was to be regarded by the fox. President Ronald Reagan was 
also instrumental in broadening the industry’s markets abroad. His administration threatened 
many Asian countries with retaliatory tariffs on goods imported from these nations if American 
cigarettes did not get access to their markets (Klüger 710). In Korea for example, smoking among 
young boys rose from 18 to 30% after American cigarettes had flooded the Korean market 
(Klüger 710-713). 
 President George Bush carried on Reagan's negligence of the tobacco issue. Neither 
President stirred a hand to encourage tobacco control legislation. During the Bush presidency the 
Environmental Protection Agency permitted itself to be pressured and meddled with by tobacco 
lawyers and officials. The Environmental Protection Agency was said to be under pressure from 
the Bush administration to shelve or play down the second-hand smoke valuation. New personal 
had reportedly been assigned to have a fresh look at the matter (Klüger 697). The Environmental 
Protection Agency finally initiated a scrutiny into whether environmental tobacco smoke could 
be lethal, but failed to declare its findings until the very final hours of the Bush administration 
(Klüger 709). 
 In the following I will give an account of Clinton's steps against the tobacco industry and 
examine his motives for taking on tobacco firms. I will also consider tobacco’s role in the 1996 
presidential election. Further, I will describe how the Republican Party and the tobacco industry 
reacted to Clinton’s anti-tobacco commitment. 
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Clinton’s first period 
Anti-tobacco fervor was on the increase in the mid-nineties. The reputation of the tobacco 
industry had become seriously damaged by revelations that the tobacco companies had tried to 
hide its knowledge of the detrimental effects of smoking from the public. In 1994, several 
thousand pages of documents from the Brown & Williamson tobacco company were sent 
anonymously to anti-smoking campaigner Stanton A. Glantz at the University of California, San 
Francisco. These documents, which had allegedly been stolen by a paralegal from a law firm 
working for Brown & Williamson, showed that the company’s own research, as early as the 
1960s, had demonstrated tobacco’s harmful effects and addictive qualities. Glantz managed to 
stave off tobacco lawyers and stored the papers in college archives and on the internet. In 1996, 
Glantz issued The Cigarette Papers, a compendium of the documents with commentary.4  
 A series of legal battles against the tobacco industry took place in the mid-nineties. Sixty 
of the nation’s top injury plaintiff’s attorneys contributed $100,000 each to fund the nation’s 
largest class-action suit on behalf of smokers addicted to cigarettes.5  Moreover, in 1994 
Mississippi became the first state in the USA to sue the tobacco industry for "deception on the 
part of the industry, violations of consumer protection laws, antitrust laws and costs for treating 
tobacco related diseases.6" This pioneering lawsuit spurred 38 state attorneys general to take the 
tobacco industry to court, demanding repayments of funds paid to treat illnesses related to 
smoking.7
 Youth smoking was also a hotly debated theme in the mid-nineties. A 1996 report from 
the Center for Disease Control concluded that smoking among youth had reached its highest level 
in 16 years. Numerous studies illustrated the influence of tobacco marketing on children’s use of 
tobacco. After having strongly denied targeting children, internal company memos surfaced 
showing that the tobacco companies had tried to hook underage smokers.8
 According to Thomas Ferguson, a professor of political science at the University of 
Massachusetts, Clinton did not initially want any confrontation with big business. After all, the 
                                                          
4 Book Review Digest 1997 
5 Ibid 
6 Chronology of Events in Tobacco Control, United States. 
National Clearinghouse on Tobacco and Health 7pp (21 Sept. 1999) Online. Internet.  
14 Sept. 00  
Http://ncth-s2.ca/ncth/docs/gen-chronusa.htm 
7 Book Review Digest  “Pringle,Peter. Cornered; big tobacco at the bar of justice.”  (1998) 
8 “Year in Review 1996” Campaign for tobacco free kids. 3 pp (11 Jun 2000) Online. Internet. 11. Jun. 2000 
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"new Democrat" Bill Clinton had been trying to "shake off the legacy of the New Deal,” and had 
been elected president with a thin support within corporate power. However, when Clinton 
proposed a modest increase in taxes on Americans in the highest income brackets, most of 
American business opposed him. The Republican Party even accused him of engaging in a class 
war. Even if the "pro-business" Clinton went to the greatest possible length to compromise with 
the industry, his health care initiative, his attempt to regulate firearms, his proposed taxes on 
energy, and his attempts to introduce legislation for environment cleanup caused him to be at war 
with the majority of the largest investors in the United States by the middle of his first term.9
 Even if one of Clinton's first acts as President was to ban smoking in the White House, 
Thomas Ferguson is of the opinion that the President did not want a major confrontation with the 
tobacco industry when he took office. Dr. David Kessler, the head of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) was only slowly escalating the campaign against tobacco. Clinton’s health 
plan, however, was to change that situation. The bringing together of advocates for health care 
reform was also the bringing together of advocates of measures against the tobacco industry. 
Raising taxes was politically very costly at the time, and being responsible for massive medical 
expenditures, tobacco was a very vulnerable source of new tax revenues. To fund the health plan, 
the White House proposed an increase in taxation of cigarette sales from 24 cents a pack to 99 
cents. This proposal sent tobacco manufacturers to battle stations.10
 Disclosures of how the tobacco industry had hidden information about smoking were to 
spur Clinton’s anti-tobacco commitment. In 1994, the FDA and ABC News revealed that the 
American tobacco industry deliberately manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes to “dose 
consumers with fine-tuned deliveries of the drug.” This revelation opened the door to a two-and-
a-half year investigation of the tobacco industry’s knowledge of nicotine’s addictive qualities and 
of the industry’s efforts to foist nicotine dependency on tobacco consumers by means of 
advanced technology. Hearings led by Democratic Representative Henry Waxman also took 
place before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, Committee on Energy and 
Commerce.11
                                                          
9 Ferguson, Thomas. “Impeachment: The Sequel, Smoke in Starr’s Chamber”  The Nation  6 pp  
(8 March 1999) Online. Internet. 14 Sept. 1999 
Http://www.thenation.com/issue/990308/0308ferguson.shtml 
10 Ibid 
11 Douglas,Clifford E. “Taking aim at the bull’s eye: the nicotine in tobacco products” Tobacco Control  
11 pp (1998) Online. Internet. 14 Sept. 2000  
 8
 The Fact that Dr. David Kessler of the Food and Drug Administration had become 
persuaded that nicotine might qualify as an addictive substance and consequently could be 
regulated by the FDA, made the relations between the Clinton Administration and the tobacco 
industry extremely strained strained. Regulation of tobacco by the FDA could mean removal 
from the market of tobacco products containing levels that cause addiction. The tobacco industry 
counterattacked by means of full-page ads in newspapers and by turning loose a legion of 
lobbyists. The industry managed to scale down the proposed cigarette tax long before Clinton’s 
health plan came to nothing, but efforts to turn aside the FDA did not succeed.12
 In 1994 David Kessler and his wife, Paula, were invited to a White House Christmas 
party. Clinton told Kessler that the Democrats had lost the House because of tobacco and gun 
control. Southern Democrats had told the President that the attempt to increase the excise tax on 
tobacco to finance the health plan, combined with the ban on assault weapons, had cost a large 
number of votes in key southern states. When Kessler's wife argued that those had been 
necessary steps, Clinton agreed, but argued that "We should have explained our position better so 
that people would have understood them better." Kessler knew he had only another moment of 
the president's time. Before the president moved away, he said: "You know there is a way to do 
this, if we focus on kids." (Kessler 300). The seeds of Clinton's fight against youth smoking had 
been planted. 
 At a strategy meeting in July 1995, Dick Morris, Clinton's advisor at the time, urged the 
President to endorse Kessler's probable conclusion that nicotine was addictive and challenge the 
tobacco companies to stop directing its tobacco ads towards kids. Initially Clinton was scared 
that such an act could ruin his chances of being re-elected. Clinton was sympathetic, but at the 
same time he was worried that he would get one day of attention in the media, whereupon he 
would lose five states. Clinton assumed that "it'll cost me whatever chance I had in North 
Carolina. I won't win Virginia anyway. But I'm most concerned about Kentucky and Tennessee. I 
need those states" (Morris 216).  
 Clinton's worries were not without foundation. Tobacco was controlling the politics of 
North Carolina and Kentucky and was heavily influencing the politics of Tennessee, Virginia, 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Http://www.bmjpg.com/data/tobarch/autumn98/editorial.htm 
12 Ferguson, Thomas. “ Impeachment: The Sequel, Smoke in Starr’s Chamber” The Nation 6 pp 
(8 March 1999) Online. Internet. !4 Sept. 1999 
Http://www.thenation.com/issue/990308/0308ferguson.shtml 
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and Georgia (Morris 215). Many members of Clinton's staff advised Clinton against endorsing 
the FDA rules. Clinton's North Carolinian Deputy Chief of staff, counseled Clinton "not to fool 
with them." Erskine Bowles, who was Clinton's link to business, was well aware of the power of 
the tobacco industry in his home state (Morris 23, 216).  Deputy Chief of Staff, Harold Ickes, was 
"counting votes." He was especially concerned about Kentucky and Tennessee. Ickes supported 
curbing youth smoking, but apparently found it wise to shelve the matter until Clinton's second 
term (Kessler305). 
  Dick Morris did not share Clinton's view that tobacco had been instrumental in the 1994 
election defeat (Kessler 305).  Polls showed that there was a broad public consensus that the 
tobacco industry should be barred from directing its tobacco ads to teenagers. Even in the 
tobacco states voters would support Clinton if he was dealing only with advertising aimed at 
children (Morris 217).  
 Before deciding whether to support the FDA rules, Clinton wanted to find out whether it 
was possible to make a deal with the tobacco industry. However, the tobacco industry was not 
interested in voluntary measures to curb youth smoking. The Republican landslide in 1994 had 
convinced the tobacco companies that Clinton would lose in 1996. They were already eagerly 
waiting for the pro-tobacco Republican presidential candidate, Bob Dole (Morris 217). 
 Clinton made extensive use of polls when identifying issues for emphasis and, as 
mentioned above, the FDA rules were no exception. Does this use of polls make Clinton a 
calculating demagogue stripped of idealism? Absolutely not. Bill Clinton was a highly idealistic 
politician, which is illustrated by the fact that he never forgot his impoverished childhood. When 
he had to do things that hurt poor people, like welfare reform and budget cuts, he became 
physically ill. His mind could accept it, but his heart could not (Morris 214). 
 According to Morris, Clinton had an idealistic side and a pragmatic side, or as Dick 
Morris put it, "the boy scout" and "the politician." In his idealistic mode, he focused on doing 
good in the world. He felt intensely idealistic emotions, but was often detached from the realistics 
of politics. In this mode, he did not want to have anything to do with Morris or pragmatism. 
When Clinton faced political adversity, he switched into his political mode.  While still being 
faithful to his principles, he did everything possible to win. Dick Morris argues that the 
alternations of these two sets of personalities explain the many comebacks in Clinton's career 
(Morris 13-14). 
 10
 Clinton did not use polls to decide what he was for. He wanted to find out how to get 
there. Morris uses the metaphor of a sailboat to explain Clinton's use of polls. The President 
always knew where he wanted to go. He consulted polls as if they were huge wind socks that told 
him where the wind (public opinion) wanted him to go. He asked his pollster to help him chose 
the current that would bring him closest to his destinations. When he had gone too far left of his 
destination, he polled again, aiming a little to the right. In the end he always ended up where he 
wanted to be, in the middle (Morris 84). 
 Clinton's initial doubt of whether to endorse the FDA rules was soon swept away. The 
fact that he learned more about the nexus of the Republican right and its link to the tobacco 
companies probably spurred him on (Morris 218). The numerous revelations of how the tobacco 
companies had tried to hide its knowledge of the detrimental effects of smoking and the addictive 
effects of nicotine probably caused Clinton to urge on with the tobacco issue. David Kessler, then 
commissioner of the FDA, recalls a meeting with Clinton in the White House in July 1995. 
Clinton had just been reading an article that summarized Brown & Williamson's knowledge 
about the effects of nicotine. "I want to kill these people, the President said." I just read all those 
documents and I want to kill them" (Kessler 331). One month later Clinton announced his 
support for the FDA rules. 
 President Clinton's final approval of FDA regulations intended to curb marketing and sale 
of tobacco to young people were announced in August 1996. Declaring tobacco an addictive 
drug, Clinton claimed that it could be regulated by the FDA. The proposed rules were intended to 
cut teenage smoking in half in the course of the next seven years and reduce the access to and 
appeal of tobacco products for youths.13
 The FDA rules barred the sale of tobacco products from vending machines and self-
service displays, except in locations where only adults had access. The rules would also limit 
youth access to tobacco products by banning free samples and the sale of cigarettes in quantities 
fewer than twenty. Tobacco advertisements within 300 meters of schools and playgrounds would 
also be banned. Tobacco ads on all other billboards would be limited to black and white text 
only, unless the ad was in a location inaccessible to youths. Tobacco ads in publications with 
significant numbers of young readers were limited to black and white text only. The proposed 
                                                          
13 “Clinton Gives FDA Rules Final Approval” Facts On File. 6 pp (29 Aug 1996) Online. Internet. 29 Jun 1999  
Http://www.facts.com/wnd/fda.htm 
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rules also banned brand-name tobacco advertising at sporting, musical, and cultural happenings. 
Events could be sponsored by tobacco companies, but only corporate names could be utilized. 
Brand-name ads were also banned on products not related to tobacco use. Buyers under 27 years 
would be required to prove their age with photo identification cards.14  
 When the original version of the regulations had been proposed in August 1995, the 
tobacco industry, joined by advertisers and publishers, had immediately filed lawsuits to block 
the regulations. The rules that were given final approval by Clinton in 1996 had been altered in 
order to fend off legal and political attacks based on assumptions that the rules affected adults as 
well as youths.15 In May 1996 the Supreme Court had strengthened First Amendment protection 
for advertising involving drinking, smoking or other conduct the government finds harmful.16  
 Clinton’s initiative was hailed by medical groups and anti-tobacco-activists and polls 
showed that the proposed rules were popular with the public. However, many of Clinton’s critics 
saw the implementation of the FDA rules as an election-year political tactic. Brown & 
Williamson and the Republican nominee for the 1996 presidential elections, Bob Dole, claimed 
that Clinton’s initiative was an attempt to draw away attention from a study showing that illegal 
drug use was on the increase among young Americans. Philip Morris claimed that Clinton’s 
moves trampled on the rights of millions of adult Americans. There were also those who said that 
the proposed rules would cost thousands of jobs in the agriculture industry. White House 
spokesman Michael McCurry admitted that the rules would eliminate 2,500 jobs over 10 years 
but, on the other hand, if effective, they would save from $28 billion to $ 43 billion in health-care 
costs.17  
 
Tobacco and the 1996 presidential election 
When President Clinton singled out tobacco for special attention in his 1995-1996 campaign for 
the Presidency, it was the first time that tobacco was a prominent issue in a presidential campaign 
and in a number of congressional races. There is every indication that the president’s stance on 
                                                          
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 Barr, Stephen and Hamilton ,Martha M. “Clinton Curtails Tobacco Ads in Bid to Cut Sales to Youth” 
Washingtonpost. com :Tobacco Special report 5 pp (24 Aug. 1996) Online. Internet. 29 Jun. 1999 
Http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tobacco/stories/ads.htm 
17”Clinton Gives FDA Rules Final Approval” Facts on File 4 pp (29 Aug 1996) Online. Internet. 29 Jun. 1999 
Http://www.facts.com/wnd/fda.htm 
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tobacco altered the balance of tobacco industry contributions to the two main parties. In the 
1991-1992 election cycles, contributions totaled at least $5.7 million, whereof approximately 57 
% went to Republican candidates for President or Congress. Total contributions in the 1993-94 
cycle were at the same level as in 1991-1992, the percentage of contributions to the Republican 
Party, however, rose to 68. Thereafter, both total contributions and the percentage given to 
Republican candidates skyrocketed. In the 1995-1996 election cycle, the tobacco industry 
contributed more than $10 million to national political campaigns, of which 80 % went to 
Republicans.18
 The American tobacco industry evidently pinned its faith on Republican candidate, Bob 
Dole, in the 1996 Presidential campaign. The Kansas senator had long been one of the industry’s 
top congressional allies. Dole had consistently opposed tax increases on tobacco, even when 
proposed by fellow Republicans. In the mid-eighties, for instance, Dole had become a loyal ally 
of the top smokeless tobacco company, US Tobacco (now called UST). The habit of using 
smokeless tobacco had been fast disappearing in the early 1980s, but a campaign to hook kids 
launched by US tobacco resulted in a smokeless epidemic among kids. In 1985, a bipartisan bill 
aimed at raising excise taxes on chewing tobacco in order to make it less affordable to 
adolescents, was introduced in Congress. Dole defeated the measure, but promised to reconsider 
it if the Surgeon General’s report, which was in hand, linked smokeless tobacco to cancer. 
However, though the 1986 surgeon general’s report eventually linked chewing tobacco and 
cancer, Bob Dole remained faithful to the smokeless tobacco industry.19 Besides, in 1993, when 
President Clinton proposed to finance his health plan partly by cigarette taxes, Bob Dole 
presented a counter proposal to Clinton’s health plan. Dole’s plan, however, did not imply taxes 
on cigarettes.20
 Bob Dole had also helped the American tobacco industry broaden its overseas markets, 
particularly in Asia. In 1985, trade representatives for the Reagan Administration threatened 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand with retaliatory tariffs on their exports if they refused 
to open their tobacco markets. During talks with Korea in 1987, Bob Dole, Senator Jesse Helms, 
and other senators from tobacco states lobbied the Korean ambassador, expressing their support 
                                                          
18 Ferguson , Thomas. “Impeachment: the Sequel.” The Nation 6 pp (8 Mar 1999) Online. Internet. 14 Sept. 1999 
Http://www.thenation.com/issue/990308/0308ferguson.shtml 
19 “The Tobacco Election” Mojo Wire 5 pp (1996) Online. Internet. 1 Aug 2000 
20 “Who Owns Bob Dole?” The Ethical Spectacle 2 pp ( Oct. 96) Online. Internet. 14 Aug 2000  
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for “fair market conditions” in Korea and were thanked by the Korean ambassador for killing a 
bill that would have imposed trade sanctions on Korea.21 The year after American cigarettes 
poured into the Korean market, and smoking rates among Korean teen-agers skyrocketed.22
 Bob Dole was also down upon tobacco enemy number one, FDA-Commissioner David 
Kessler during his presidential campaign, pledging that he would fire him if elected. Dole was 
one of 32 senators who signed a letter to the FDA, protesting its measures against tobacco 
advertising. Kessler’s plan to limit cigarette advertising at sporting events was also a subject of 
Dole’s criticism. At a Nascar race in Darlington, South Carolina, he was observed waving a T-
shirt that read: "Let Winston Cup make the rules for Nascar, not the FDA." 23
 A great number of tobacco lobbyists, tobacco lawyers, and tobacco pollsters were 
attached to the Dole campaign. Chief pollster for Bob Dole, William McInturff, had tobacco ties. 
His polling firm, Public Opinion Strategies, had carried out a poll on behalf of the four largest 
tobacco firms, and the Tobacco Institute which was meant to deter Texas Attorney General Dan 
Morales from filing suit against the tobacco industry. McInturff’s poll, which claimed that a 
majority of Texans would not favor the proposed lawsuit, turned out to be a “push poll” designed 
to sway public opinion, rather than to gauge it.24
 Dole’s former chief of staff, Roderick DeArment, was the chairman of Lawyers for Dole, 
a group of lawyers raising funds for Dole’s campaign. DeArment’s Washington law firm, 
Covington & Burling, had represented the major tobacco companies and the Tobacco Institute. 
Paul Manafort, Dole’s Convention Manager, was a well-known Washington lobbyist, whose firm 
had represented Philip Morris. Subsidiaries of Manafort’s firm had represented the National 
Smokers Alliance. Vice-president of Corporate Affairs for Philip Morris, Tom Collamore, was 
Dole’s main campaign fund-raiser. Jeannie Austen, a national co-chair of Dole’s campaign, was 
an active member of the National Smokers Alliance advisory board. Dole’s senior advisor and 
California strategist, Steve Merksamer, had collected $1.9 million from the tobacco industry 
through his California law firm. And, finally, Dole’s Midwest strategist, Tom Synhorst, and 
                                                          
21 Kaplan, Sheila. “Tobacco Dole (cont’d)” Mojo Wire 4 pp (1996) Online. Internet. 1 Aug. 2000 
22 Klein, Jeffrey. “The Tobacco Election” Mojo Wire 2 pp (1996) Online. Internet. 14 Sept. 1999 
wysiwyg://81/http.//bsd.mojones.com/mother_jones/MJ96/klein.html 
23 Kaplan, Sheila. “Tobacco Dole (cont’d)” Mojo Wire 4 pp (1996) Online. Internet. 1 Aug. 2000 
24 Kaplan, Sheila. “Tobacco Dole” MojoWire 3 pp (1996) Online. Internet. 1 Aug. 2000 
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Alaska Campaign Coordinator Frank Bickford were both coordinators for R.J.Reynolds 
Tobacco’s attempts to create “grassroots groups” in the states.25  
 Bob Dole had received ample contributions from the tobacco industry during his entire 
career. In addition to untold sums of tobacco soft money through the Republican National 
Committee, Bob Dole had received more than $ 330,000 directly from RJR, Philip Morris, and 
UST. 26 Besides, Dole had accepted rides in corporate jets from the companies mentioned above. 
UST, for instance had given Dole at least 26 subsidized rides.27
 Bob Dole did not wish to make tobacco a subject in his campaign. When confronted with 
this issue, he often produced comments which were understood as pro-tobacco. During a tour in 
Kentucky, for instance, he raised doubts as to whether tobacco was addictive. He also accused 
NBC "Today" show host Katie Couric for "maybe violating the FEC regulation by always 
sticking up for Democrats", when asked whether smoking was addictive. Later in his campaign, 
Dole appeared to lump narcotics and cigarettes together when speaking to an anti-drug gathering 
at a small Christian church. "My view is, using drugs is wrong, you shouldn’t smoke cigarettes. 
Let’s just throw them all out at the same time," Dole declared in his unprepared speech. When 
reporters asked whether he linked drug use with cigarette smoking, Dole replied: "I did not say 
anything about cigarettes. I talked about drugs. I said you shouldn’t smoke either." 28
 President Clinton’s campaign assailed Dole on the tobacco issue and presented the 
president as the candidate who wanted to protect children. In an ad launched in July 1996, 
Clinton’s campaign focused on the fact that Dole had opposed FDA’s proposal to limit tobacco 
ads that appealed to children, and it also revived Dole’s comment that cigarettes are not 
necessarily addictive.29 Vice-president Al Gore also promoted the anti-tobacco issue during the 
campaign. In a speech in Philadelphia in June 1996, for instance, Gore accused Dole of being 
addicted to tobacco money for campaign contributions.30 A Bob Dole on the defensive justified 
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accepting tobacco money by underscoring that the tobacco industry is a legal business and that 
the industry also is involved in producing other products.31
 Bob Dole accused the Democrats of hypocrisy on the tobacco issue. He rightfully pointed 
to the hundreds of thousands of dollars Democrats had received from the tobacco industry since 
1982.32 When confronted with such figures, the Democrats claimed to be less influenced by 
tobacco money than the Republicans. During the presidential campaign, DNC spokesman David 
Eichenbaum said that the party’s tough stand on tobacco showed that Democrats cannot be 
bought.33  
 Dole supporters also criticized the Democrats for voting against eliminating tobacco 
subsidies in August 1996. 85 House Democrats, of whom 75% were Southern Democrats, voted 
to retain the tobacco subsidies. The proposed amendment would have transferred $25 million of 
taxpayer funds from tobacco crop insurance and salaries for personnel performing tobacco 
related services to rural health programs.34
 The tobacco issue formed a part of Clinton’s carefully planned election strategy. In his 
book Behind the Oval Office, Dick Morris, Clinton’s advisor in the 1996 election, reveals the 
scandal-ridden president’s strategy to retain the presidency. According to Morris, Clinton’s key 
to success was the following formula: "Public values defeat private scandal." People felt good 
about the economy in 1995. Personal well-being was impaired by the dysfunction of society, not 
by a lack of income (Morris 86). Morris’ advice to Clinton was to “remove fiscal issues and keep 
attention on social issues, since when Republicans are reduced to only social message, they 
lose.”35
 Morris hoped that the Republicans would get mixed up in (for them) unwise battles over 
social issues. In connection with the Oklahoma City bombing, for instance, Morris advised 
Clinton to lure the Republican Party into a debate over restrictions on high-powered weapons, 
well knowing that gun owners held a sway over the GOP against the broader public. In this way, 
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Morris hoped that the Republican Party would link itself to extremists.36 Similarly, by raising the 
tobacco issue, Clinton and Morris hoped that the GOP would produce a linkage between the 
Republican Party and an increasingly unpopular tobacco industry. 
 The tobacco issue was not only a central part of Clinton’s "family values" agenda. It was 
simultaneously a counter-point to Dole’s attack on Clinton's character. Dole believed that 
character was his trump card in the presidential campaign. He had combat experiences in the 
World War II and had battled tenaciously to recover from the terrible injuries he suffered in the 
war.37
 During his campaign, Dole assailed Clinton's character by referring to the Whitewater 
scandal and to ethical problems in the White House.38 However, Bob Dole’s remarks on tobacco 
during his campaign and his opposition to the proposed FDA rules, made it possible for Clinton 
to claim that Dole was in the pocket of the tobacco industry. Time Magazine reporter Eric Pooley 
wrote: "It was as if the cunning Clinton advisor Dick Morris had found a way to program Dole’s 
brain, making him take the position that best contrasts with the president’s carefully molded 
save-the-children image."39 The debate of tobacco turned out to be a success for Clinton and a 
veritable mousetrap for Bob Dole. 
 It is interesting to note that Al Gore’s harsh attack on Dole’s tobacco contributions came 
on the same day that the Senate Republicans prepared a report that criticized the way the White 
House had dealt with Whitewater. The very same day two long-time Clinton supporters went on 
trial in Arkansas, and the White House was being plied with questions about the collection of FBI 
files on Republicans.40 Gore's accusations were probably meant as a countermove to the hail of 
allegations against Clinton. 
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Clinton’s Second Term 
After he was re-elected, President Clinton continued to push for sweeping tobacco legislation. In 
August 1997 President Clinton signed an executive order requiring Executive Branch federal 
worksites to be smoke free.41 By doing so Clinton showed that he took the Environmental 
Protection Agency' risk assessment on secondhand smoke seriously. EPA administrator William 
Reilly had released this report in 1993, just a few days before President Bush left the White 
House. EPA, which had started looking into the risk assessment on environmental tobacco smoke 
(ETS) five years earlier, concluded that ETS is lethal to man. Secondhand smoke was classified 
as a group A carcinogen. (Other group A carcinogens are asbestos and radon.) EPA had found 
that ETS killed 52,000 Americans a year. 15000 of these deaths were ascribed to cancer and the 
rest to hearth disease (Kluger 737). 
 The EPA report outraged a tobacco industry which had denied the lethal consequences of 
smoking for a generation. Six tobacco organizations, among others R.J. Reynolds and Philip 
Morris, filed a suit against the EPA, challenging the scientific evidence which made EPA 
conclude that secondhand smoke caused 3,000 cases of lung cancer in non-smokers each year. In 
1998 a North Carolina district court was to set voided parts of the EPA report on environmental 
tobacco smoke, a decision the Clinton administration immediately was to appeal.42
 In 1997, President Clinton initiated an attempt to draft a federal tobacco bill building on 
an accord between 40 state attorneys and the major tobacco companies. This accord, often called 
the 1997 settlement, was in many ways a historic agreement. If made into federal law, it would 
have required the tobacco companies to pay $368 billion over 25 years to settle lawsuits brought 
by states in order to be reimbursed for costs of treating smoking-related illnesses. The tobacco 
industry was also to pay $60 billion in punitive damages for having deceived the public about the 
dangers of smoking. In return, the tobacco companies would gain immunity from punitive 
damages for past actions and gain protection from future class-action suits. The tobacco industry 
had also agreed to be regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.43
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 The 1997 settlement included measures to curb youth smoking. The tobacco industry 
would pay for anti-smoking education campaigns, which included programs directed at young 
smokers. The industry would also pay fines if youth smoking failed to drop. Tobacco advertising 
on billboards, store fronts, on the internet and at sporting events would be prohibited. Most print 
advertising would be in black and white, text only, and human and cartoon images would be 
banned. The settlement also implied a ban on vending machines.44
 The 1997 settlement definitely pleased those whose only purpose was to curb youth 
smoking. In many ways, the proposed rules went beyond the FDA rules aimed at reducing 
smoking among teenagers, which Clinton had approved in 1996. Other aspects of the deal, 
however, were harshly criticized.45 Elisabeth Whelan, the president of the American Council on 
Sciences and Health called the accord "the biggest drug pay off of the century." FDA chief David 
Kessler and former surgeon General C. Everett Koop urged Congress to forego the 1997 
settlement and instead draft legislation without giving concessions.46 Central in the debate over 
concessions were the millions of tobacco industry documents that were protected from 
disclosure. Anti-tobacco activists argued that it would be wrong to give the tobacco industry 
concessions without knowing the facts about its former conduct.47 Several other aspects of the 
tobacco deal were blasted. There were those who said that $ 360 billion would buy less 25 years 
ahead in time and that the states could get more in court.48 The fact that the tobacco settlement 
was passed over tobacco farmers’ objections was also a target of criticism. Other critics pointed 
to the fact that the tobacco accord did not impose restrictions on the tobacco companies’ 
marketing aimed at children abroad.49
 The 1997 tobacco deal between the tobacco companies and the states had been negotiated 
beyond the president’s control. Clinton took a tough stand against parts of the tobacco accord. At 
a news conference in September 1997, he emphasized the importance of codifying the deal in 
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Congress as quickly as possible, but he underscored that it had to be done in the right way. The 
president also stressed that the Federal Government was not rejecting the deal, but building on it, 
and he urged changes of five parts of the tobacco settlement.50 According to Clinton, the FDA 
should have unrestricted authority over tobacco regulation. The 1997 settlement allowed a ban on 
nicotine only if the FDA could prove that this would not cause a black market in tobacco. Clinton 
termed this provision unacceptable.51 He also underscored that disclosure of industry documents 
had brought the tobacco industry to the negotiating table, and he demanded that the industry 
uncover secret documents and research before any deal could be made. Another of Clinton's 
points addressed the necessity of increasing research into the medical effects of tobacco use. 
Clinton also promised to help “hard-working and honest” tobacco farmers. Finally the President 
addressed youth smoking. He pressed for an increase of the fines the 1997 settlement imposed on 
cigarette makers if youth smoking failed to drop to certain levels.52  
 The process of drafting federal tobacco legislation in Congress was not very successful. 
The Republicans, who had the majority of both houses, spread the many parts of the 1997 
settlement among various committees. According to Time reporter Bruce Van Voorst, the GOP 
created the illusion of action in the same way that kids “spread lima beans around their plates to 
create the illusion of eating them.” 53  
 At the beginning of March 1998, President Clinton stepped up his campaign for tobacco 
legislation, which had been stalled in Congress. Counting the days left of the 105th Congress, the 
President called for action and pointed to the fact that 3,000 kids would start smoking on each of 
those days. Republicans retorted that drugs were an even greater problem among youth, and the 
Chairman of the Commerce Committee, Tom Bliley, questioned Clinton's commitment to draft a 
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tobacco bill. Bliley, who controlled House action on tobacco legislation, claimed that Clinton had 
not sent Congress any plan of action.54  
 However, many Republicans were realizing that voters were increasingly anti-tobacco. 
Fear of being linked to the tobacco industry in the November 1998 election made Republicans 
more willing to take action.55 Newt Gingrich told tobacco lobbyists: “I will not let Clinton get to 
the left of me on this. We will not support anything the industry is for.”56 Don Nickles, the 
Senate’s second-ranking Republican, summoned a group of Republican senators and forced a 
decision: One single committee would now be in charge of drafting tobacco legislation. 
Republican senator John McCain was given the task of producing a federal tobacco bill, building 
on the 1997 settlement. McCain did not fail to remind his fellow Republicans of the possibility of 
being hammered in the 1998 election on the tobacco issue. Some Republicans were shocked 
when they were informed that the condition of Clinton's support was that the price of a pack of 
cigarettes would rise $1.10 over five years. "We got to go with the president's numbers," McCain 
told a worried Republican. “Otherwise we open up to the charge that all we care about is the 
tobacco companies."57  
 The tobacco bill which emerged from the Senate Commerce Committee in April was 
more punitive towards the tobacco industry than the 1997 settlement. It required the industry to 
pay $516 billion, and it raised the annual cap on individual liability to $6.5 billion. Clinton 
imposed his will: Taxes on cigarettes would be raised to $1.10 a pack over 5 years.58 The bill 
also included provisions to help tobacco farmers.59 But most importantly, the McCain bill did not 
give any legal concessions to the tobacco industry.60
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 However, shortly after the bill’s approval by the Senate Commerce Committee, the 
tobacco industry withdrew its support of the bill, claiming that it had become too expensive and 
punitive. 61 “I will not voluntarily sign my company into bankruptcy,” Steven Goldstone, CEO of 
RJR Nabisco Holding Corp, told Republican leaders. “I prefer to go bankrupt the old way---
through the courts.” 62 Subsequently, the five major tobacco companies launched a $40 million 
advertising campaign, arguing that politicians had ruined a well-meant offer. The tobacco 
companies complained that the McCain bill would “devastate people employed in growing and 
distributing tobacco, and [was] aimed less at youth smoking than at raising new tax revenue for 
politicians.” 63  
 Many Republicans also disliked the broad sweep of the McCain bill. They argued that it 
would result in an uncontrollable black market for cigarettes and that it would help wealthy trial 
lawyers. The Republicans also claimed that McCain's proposal was a regressive tax on the poor, 
since poor people tend to smoke more. This argument filled many Democrats with indignation. 
Senator John Kennedy responded: "I listened to those crocodile tears of our colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle about how distressed they are about what is happening to working families. 
I give them reassurance; they will have a nice chance to vote for an increase in the minimum 
wage later on, and we will see how distressed they are about all those working families that they 
agonizing about and so distressed because this is a regressive tax." 64
 However, the Republicans focused special attention on the "tax and spend" aspects of the 
McCain bill. House leaders were especially skeptical towards the tax hike on cigarettes, which by 
many was considered necessary to make cigarettes unaffordable to kids.65 House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich, House Majority Leader Richard K. Armey, House Majority whip Tom DeLay and 
National Republican Congressional Committee Chairman John Linder were all opposed to using 
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new taxes to finance government programs. In an interview on NBC television, Gingrich blasted 
McCain's proposal. "I am opposed to a liberal tobacco bill, which would raise taxes to create 
bigger government," he said. "I think we ought to give back to the taxpayers every penny of new 
revenue from tobacco."66
 The House was considering drafting a less sweeping bill, more narrowly tailored to curb 
youth teenage smoking. This proposed bill, which most likely would have avoided the liability 
issue, would have raised the legal smoking age from 18 to 21, forbidden vending machine sales 
of cigarettes, and channeled increased cigarette taxes to research into tobacco-related diseases 
and campaigns against youth smoking.67 Newt Gingrich had identified the fighting of drugs as 
one of his priorities, and the House considered combining the combat against drug and tobacco in 
one bill. Such a move would have allowed Gingrich to attack Clinton for lack of initiative in the 
fight against drugs. However, many Republicans worried about the consequences of a "tobacco 
bill lite" in the November election. They feared that Clinton would portray the Republican Party 
as beholden to tobacco interests.68
 In a Rose Garden speech in late April, Clinton gave members of Congress a taste of the 
attacks they could expect in the 1998 election if they sided with the tobacco industry. He warned 
against half-measures and expressed concern about Newt Gingrich's attacks on the tobacco bill 
sponsored by Senator John McCain. Clinton said he hoped Gingrich would "return to his former 
position.”  “Before his recent comments I had been encouraged, because he basically said he 
would not permit us to take a stronger position than he did,” Clinton said.69 
 The McCain bill was not only criticized by conservatives. Some critics claimed that the 
bill gave the tobacco industry too many concessions and protections. The bill capped damages in 
civil lawsuits (maximum $6.5 billion a year). It was also argued that the annual payments the 
companies were required  to make to the government  were passed on to the consumers. The fact 
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that payments under the McCain bill were tax deductible was also criticized and likewise the fact 
that the bill would only permit domestic tobacco subsidiaries to be sued. It was also maintained 
that the bill in many cases would function as a pre-emption of state action.70  
 The possibility for the bill to pass in the Senate was probably ruined on May 21, 1998, 
when senators who did not find the bill punitive enough joined conservative senators opposed to 
the bill in approving an amendment which suggested stripping the bill of caps on the tobacco 
industry’s future liability. Supporters of the bill were of the opinion that the tobacco bill had to 
include some legal protection of the tobacco industry in order to be approved by the Senate.71
 Even though the Senate passed amendments tying the McCain bill to pet Republican 
causes such as tax cuts and anti-drug measures, Republicans characterized the bill as «tax and 
spend». The tobacco bill was voted down by the Senate Republicans on June 17, 1998. Majority 
leader Trent Lott justified the defeat of the bill by calling it a "cookie jar" meant to provide 
money for government programs.72
 The Democrats thundered against the Republicans, claiming that the Senate GOP had 
fattened the bill with amendments only to kill it off for being too heavy. Arguing that the 
Republican Party was in league with the tobacco industry, Democrats promised to keep the 
tobacco issue alive. Shortly after the demise of the bill, Senate Democrats unsuccessfully tried to 
attach tobacco legislation to an appropriations bill.73 President Clinton also promised to go on 
fighting for tobacco legislation both in Congress and in the 1998 elections.  To spread an image 
of optimism, Clinton announced that the Department of Health and Human Services, by 
executive order, would conduct surveys to determine which brands that enjoyed favor among 
underage smokers.74  
 Republicans evidently feared that the defeat of the McCain bill would backfire in the 
November elections. Some analysts argued that the tobacco bill was killed in the Senate for fear 
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that the House Republicans would be hurt in the coming elections if the bill had been defeated 
there. However, The Republicans probably hoped the focus on the "tax and spend" aspects of the 
bill would have a broad appeal to the voters and would thus overshadow any possible linkage 
between the tobacco industry and the Republican Party.75  The fact that House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich revived the House plan of drafting a tobacco bill which would be more narrowly 
focused to curb youth smoking shortly after the defeat of the McCain bill was a clear attempt to 
characterize the Republican Party as anti-tobacco. However, Gingrich did not describe this plan 
in detail. He only said it would focus on a public awareness campaign and on incentives to states 
which decreased smoking rates among teenagers. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott also 
declared that he would champion a less costly tobacco bill aimed at curbing youth smoking.76 
One may also suspect that the Republicans found it likely that the Lewinsky scandal and the 
impeachment process would smear Clinton’s character to such an extent that the tobacco issue 
would lose its momentum in the 1998 elections. 
 The Republicans’ alternative plan fell flat among health advocates, Democrats and the 
White House alike. It was characterized as worse than nothing at all. "This is no time for a fig 
leaf," said Matthew Myers, CEO of the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. Myers claimed that a 
bill more aimed at protecting Congressmen in the November elections than at curbing youth 
smoking would be rejected by health groups. White House press secretary Michael McCurry 
said: "There is no such thing as a slimmed-down bill that protects kids from tobacco smoking."77  
 There were many reasons for the failure of the tobacco bill. Clinton blamed the massive 
advertising campaign launched by the tobacco industry.78 This campaign was considered to have 
cleared the way for the Republicans’ tax and spend message. However, President Clinton was 
also criticized for the defeat of the bill. Former Clinton advisor Dick Morris, for instance, was of 
the opinion that Clinton had not exercised enough leadership during the preparation of the bill. 
According to Morris, Clinton should have contributed to a tobacco bill that would have raised 
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more support among Republicans. The Democrats, on the other hand, maintained that their 
efforts of "deal-cutting" did not succeed, since Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott had given in to 
conservative pressure at the very last moment. 79  
 The failure of the McCain bill was a major setback for President Clinton. If the bill had 
passed, it would have been the most sweeping social legislation in the 1990s.80 The demise of the 
bill was also a slap in the face for Clinton's theory of governing during his second term. After his 
reelection in 1996, Clinton had to come to grips with a Republican majority in Congress. By 
promoting a centrist agenda, Clinton had hoped to find a common ground with moderate 
Republicans, like John McCain. The fact that the tobacco bill was voted down, crushed Clinton's 
hopes of passing legislation he desired and also left Clinton with a funding problem. 81 The 
McCain bill would have provided $2 billion a year for social programs championed by Clinton.82
 With federal tobacco legislation on the shelf, the tobacco industry and the states went 
back to the bargaining table in 1998 and negotiated the $206 billion deal to settle all state 
lawsuits pending against the industry. This agreement laid an embargo on goods carrying 
cigarette logos, prohibited cartoon characters in commercial advertising, forbade tobacco ads on 
scoreboards at sport events, introduced further billboard restrictions, and put an end to the 
practice of tobacco companies paying television and cinema studios to exhibit tobacco 
products.83  
 There were those who encouraged states to reject this deal. Consumer advocate Ralph 
Nader, for instance, characterized the settlement as a "sweetheart deal" for the tobacco industry. 
Among other things, Nader pointed to the fact that the deal would allow the tobacco companies 
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to keep secret many documents proving wrongdoing, and that it would prevent future attorneys 
general from taking major steps against the tobacco industry.84
 Some critics, including President Clinton, called attention to the fact that the 1998 
settlement did not protect tobacco farmers. However, Clinton endorsed the plan in mid-
November, on the condition that protective measures for tobacco farmers were taken.85 In 
January 1999, President Clinton proposed a 55-cent cigarette tax aimed at reducing teen smoking. 
White House officials said they hoped the tax would be included in a more extensive tobacco bill. 
In order to avoid a "tax and spend stigma", Clinton linked the cigarette tax to expenses related to 
smoking.86  
 Clinton's proposal raised protests among Republicans and representatives of the tobacco 
industry. Despite the linkage mentioned above, communications director of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, Ari Fleicher, made the following remark. "Unlike last year, the president’s 
[cigarette tax] proposal has nothing to do with health care, but has everything to do with raising 
taxes to pay for government programs. That’s troubling because it signals a return to the days of 
tax and spend." Tobacco industry spokesman Scott Williams said: "There is no specific, hard 
evidence to prove that the [administration’s] premise that taxation would reduce the number of 
teenage smokers."87 Surgeon General David Satcher, on the other hand, commented on Clinton's 
proposal in the following way: "Some studies show that for every 10 percent increase in price, 
there is a 7 percent decrease in smoking with children and a 4 percent decrease in adults."88  
 In his State of the Union Message, in January 1999, Clinton took the tobacco industry by 
surprise by announcing that the Justice Department was planning a law suit against the major 
American tobacco companies to recover costs of treating smoking-related illnesses. "Taxpayers 
shouldn’t pay for the cost of lung cancer, emphysema and other smoking-related illnesses. The 
tobacco companies should," the president said. 89
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 Eight months later, President Clinton made good his promise. On September 22, the 
Justice Department filed suit against Philip Morris Companies, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 
American Tobacco Co; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co Inc; Liggett and Myers Inc, The 
Council for Tobacco Research USA, and the Tobacco Institute Inc. In its complaint, the Justice 
Department claimed that the tobacco companies had conspired to conceal the risks of cigarette 
smoking. Asserting that smoking-related illnesses cost the Federal Government billions of dollars 
annually, the Justice Department sought to be reimbursed for those funds. Since the Federal 
Government has more resources than the states, this lawsuit could be extremely damaging to the 
tobacco industry. The tobacco companies, however, questioned the Clinton Administration’s 
authority to file such a lawsuit and were confident that the Justice Department did not have a 
valid case against the tobacco companies.90
 As mentioned above, Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, sought reimbursements for 
the health care costs caused by tobacco use, but in August 2000, District Court Judge Gladys 
Kessler threw out that part of the suit. However, the charges related to the racketeering law were 
allowed to go forward.91 Presidential candidate George W. Bush, who received $120.000 from 
the tobacco industry in 1999 and 2000, expressed uneasiness with the federal tobacco suit during 
his presidential campaign. Senator and future Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, who without 
failure voted in favor of the tobacco industry, was staunchly opposed to the suit.  Tobacco 
activists therefore feared that the lawsuit was not to survive the Bush administration.92  
 After having nibbled with the idea of a settlement with the tobacco industry, Ashcroft 
decided not to drop the suit. 93 The Cato Institute, which receives ample contributions from the 
tobacco industry, slammed Ashcroft for keeping the tobacco suit alive. Robert A Levy, a senior 
fellow at Cato, contended that "the government's evidence [was] so flimsy and flawed that the 
Justice Department [was]wasting taxpayer money on the case." The Cato Institute also accused 
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“Clinton leftovers in the departments for pushing the case while Bush and Ashcroft were busy 
fighting terrorism.”94
 Against all odds, President Clinton's wish for a federal lawsuit against the tobacco 
industry became a reality in September 2004. Given the discomfort President Bush felt with the 
lawsuit during his campaign for the presidency and Ashcroft's rejection of it as a senator, it is 
hardly plausible that the Bush Administration would have taken the initiative to such a case. On 
August 17, 2006 District Judge Gladys Kessler sided with the government in this landmark suit. 
The tobacco companies were found guilty in having “violated civil racketeering laws and 
defrauded the American people by lying for decades about the health risks of smoking and their 
marketing to children.”95  
 President Clinton continued to fight through the courts for FDA’s authority to regulate 
tobacco during his second term. A lower court had upheld FDA’s right to regulate tobacco in 
1997. The tobacco industry appealed this decision, and in 1998 a court of appeal reversed the 
lower court ruling. The Clinton Administration appealed to the Supreme Court to confirm FDA’s 
authority to regulate tobacco.96 In March 2000, The United States Supreme Court ruled that the 
federal Food and Drug Administration cannot regulate tobacco products without approval from 
Congress.97
 During the 1980s presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush had helped the tobacco 
industry open markets to American cigarettes abroad. The following words from Vice-President 
Dan Quayle to a group in North Carolina may be said to sum up the situation: "Tobacco exports 
should be expanded aggressively, because Americans are smoking less."98
 The arrival of President Clinton in the White House marked a shift in this practice. His 
administration refused to intervene on behalf of American tobacco companies which were 
seeking to sell and manufacture cigarettes abroad. As a rule American embassies abroad were 
instructed not to help tobacco companies expand foreign markets. The fact that the Clinton 
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administration refused to push China to end its state tobacco monopoly is an example of this 
practice. Tobacco companies lobbied the Clinton administration to stop South Korea from 
imposing new requirements on foreign firms trying to sell and manufacture cigarettes in that 
country. The Clinton administration, however, refused to stop Korea from imposing these new 
rules. On his last day in the White House, President Clinton endorsed an executive order making 
it official policy to "take strong action to address the potential global epidemic of diseases caused 
by tobacco use." The order also said that executive agendas were not to push the export of 
tobacco products or "seek the reduction or removal of foreign government restrictions on the 
marketing and advertising of tobacco products." 99  
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THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY EMBRACES THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 
 
The Tobacco Industry and GOP ideology 
The Laissez-faire doctrine has always been an important element of the ideology of the 
Republican Party. In the last decades of the 20th century, however, a more extreme version of 
laissez-faire capitalism seemed to get a foothold within the GOP. According to moderate 
Republican John Saloma, in his Omnious Politics: The New Conservative Labyrinth (1983), 
right-wing conservatives developed a long-term strategy in the 1970s which was aimed at taking 
over the Republican Party and creating an America where the government practically does not 
interfere with business. Saloma argues that the creation of conservative think tanks, advocacy 
groups, and public policy organizations played an important role in that strategy. Saloma also 
insists that the expansion of corporate lobbying, corporate advocacy advertising, and the creation 
of conservative legal and campus-based activities were instrumental in the Republican Party's 
right turn.100
 In 1994, the conservatism of the Republican Party manifested itself in an official 
document, "The Contract with America", where House Republicans and aspiring Republican 
candidates pledged to hold a vote on a number of conservative issues the first 100 days of a 
Republican majority in both chambers of Congress. The Contract with America included the 
following issues: balancing the budget, cutting taxes, controlling entitlement programs, ending 
welfare, and tough measures against crime.101 The Contract also included an extensive regulatory 
rollback bill, the Regulatory Reform Act.102 This act was aimed at "getting the government off 
the backs of individuals", and an implementation of this legislation would have destroyed the 
FDA and other public health and safety agencies.103
 A 1995 article in The Chronicle Philanthropy argues that conservative grant makers 
"provided much of the intellectual firepower behind the Republican victories in the November 
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1994 elections" and can thus be said to support Saloma's thesis. It is interesting to note that Chris 
Olander, Executive Director of the J.M. Foundation, commented the Republican landslide as 
follows: "This is the second half of the Reagan revolution. President Reagan cut taxes, but 
couldn't bring down the size of government and cut spending. Now there is a tremendous 
opportunity to complete the other half." 104
 In order to avoid business regulation and tax hikes, the tobacco industry has given grants 
to conservative groups with an anti-regulatory agenda. These groups exert considerable influence 
over the GOP, and tobacco manufacturers can thus be said to have been instrumental in taking 
the Republican Party to the right. The Heritage Foundation, for example, which is considered the 
most influential organization supporting the GOP,105 receives substantial financial support from 
Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds.106 The Heritage Foundation, whose political philosophies 
include unrestricted capitalism and deregulation of industry, drafted "The Mandate for 
Leadership", which can be said to have been the "blueprint" for the Reagan presidency. 107 This 
influential think tank, which has been called a "Shadow Government" by many investigative 
journalists, among others John Saloma in his Ominous Politics, also participated in the 
development of Gingrich's "Contract with America." 108 The Cato Institute, which promotes a 
policy based on limited government and free markets, is also supported by the tobacco 
industry.109 In their 1996 book, No Mercy: How Conservative Think Tanks and Foundation 
Changed America's Social Agenda, Jean Stefanic and Richard Delgado argue that the Cato 
Institute "played a key role in forming the ideas and policies of the new Republican majority in 
Congress" (Stefancic and Delgado 67). Other tobacco-supported think thanks with anti-
regulatory agendas and close links to the Republican Party include the American Enterprise 
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Institute, the Hudson Institute, the Progress and Freedom Foundation, and the Washington Legal 
Foundation.110
 Considering the fact that the tobacco industry was threatened with regulation and tax 
hikes during the Clinton Administration, it is beyond doubt that the implementation of the anti-
tax and anti-government aspects of the Contract with America would be favorable to the tobacco 
manufacturers. However, the Contract also stressed family values, and in this respect there seems 
to be an ideological conflict between the GOP's anti-regulatory business stance and the need to 
regulate a product which brings sorrow and suffering to a large number of American families 
year after year. Seemingly, the GOP was faced with the dilemma of whether to protect the 
tobacco industry's business rights by opposing regulation or to denote tobacco an "anti-life" 
substance that must be regulated.  I think the last option could be in accordance with the ideology 
of the Republican Party. Traditionally, the GOP does not advocate a "get the government off our 
backs" ideology regarding to substances and practices it finds harmful, for example abortion. The 
1980 Republican platform, for instance, called on presidents to appoint judges "who respect 
traditional values and the sanctity of innocent human life." 111 To my way of thinking, protecting 
children from aggressive tobacco advertisement embraces the conception of "protecting innocent 
human life." 
 Considering that tobacco kills 400,000 Americans every year and that new research 
shows that tobacco use may cause more than 100,000 miscarriages annually, one would perhaps 
think that the newcomers in the GOP, the religious right, with its pro-life stance, would stand up 
against tobacco.112 But surprisingly, the vast majority of the religious right is silent about 
tobacco. Christian Coalition spokesperson Monica Hildebrandt says that her organization does 
not take any position regarding the tobacco and the smoking industry. The assistant press 
secretary of the Family Research Council, Kristin Hansen, argues that premarital sex is the root 
of teenagers' problems, and thus deflects questions about tobacco. Concerned women for 
America find it more important to fight sex education among teenagers than to fight for tobacco 
legislation.113
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 High-profile religious leaders like the former Christian Coalition Executive Director 
Ralph Reed and Coalition founder Pat Robertson have not given priority to the tobacco issue. 
This is illustrated by the correspondence between a well-known tobacco activist and the two 
Christian leaders mentioned above. Tobacco-control activists were disillusioned when the 1994 
Republican landslide had a braking effect on efforts to control tobacco. This was also true of 
former chairman of the coalition on smoking or Health, Scott Ballin. However, having gone 
through the "Contract with America", Ballin saw a glimmer of hope. Many of the groups on the 
religious right had been instrumental in shaping the Contract, and parts of it focused on children, 
ethics, and families. Ballin began writing letters to Pat Robertson and Ralph Reed, urging their 
help in the tobacco-control movement. He also sent Reed and Robertson a study and a Surgeon 
General's report that linked smoking to miscarriages and damage on the fetus. Ralph Reed did not 
respond to many of Ballin's letters, and the letters he answered did not take any position on the 
tobacco issue. Reed's stance towards tobacco was made clear in 1995, when he characterized 
President Clinton's fight against tobacco as a "political stunt that had created a lot of problems for 
Democrats in Kentucky." At the 1995 annual convention of the Christian Coalition, Reed 
criticized Clinton for "preaching against the dangers of tobacco after having gutted the drug 
czar's office."114
 Pat Robertson, on the other hand, who had previously spoken out against tobacco, and 
who had even been deprived of points on a religious scorecard in 1988 for having supported a tax 
hike on liquor and cigarettes, replied regularly, expressing approval for Ballin's efforts to reduce 
smoking. However, Robertson's supporting words did not result in action. When Ballin wrote the 
"Contract for the Protection of America's Families and Children from Tobacco Use" imitating the 
language of the Contract with the American Family, Robertson signed it, but did not show up at 
the press conference where anti-smoking activists disclosed it. In his magazine, where he 
addresses Christian Coalition members, he has only once commented on Clinton's decision to 
regulate tobacco, characterizing it as "the latest in a dangerous trend of executive 
overreaching."115
 The fact that Robertson and Reed have not added tobacco to the Coalition's 
"Congressional scorecard", which instructs conservative churchgoers on which candidates to vote 
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for, further illustrates the two Christian leaders' lack of will to take on the tobacco industry. 40 
million copies of this scorecard were distributed in 1994. It is interesting to note that Robertson, 
on his TV show, has wondered how his "dear friend" Jesse Helms can be a defender of tobacco.  
On the Coalition's 1994 scorecard, however, Helms got a perfect grade, while Bob Bennett (R-
Utah), a supporter of measures against youth smoking, was hammered for supporting the 
appointment of a Clinton nominee who was a lesbian.116  
 Reed and Robertson apparently did not inform the Christian Coalition about the research 
on miscarriages that Ballin had sent them. When confronted with the tobacco issue, the 
Coalition's North Carolina field director, Phil Crowson, said that the Coalition's big issues are 
saving the unborn lives and reducing the amount of illegal pornography. When asked about the 
large numbers of miscarriages caused by smoking, Crowson was genuinely shocked. He claimed 
never to have been told about that research.117
 Why is the religious right silent about tobacco? Religious leaders have expressed 
discomfort about fighting for a cause that has been so strongly championed by liberals. Standing 
up against tobacco would also create conflicts with pro-tobacco allies. It would also create 
conflicts with party donors. In the 1993-1994 election cycles, for instance, tobacco companies 
gave $259,027 to the National Republican Senatorial Committee which, according to report, gave 
$175,000 to the National Right to life political action committee. Geography also plays an 
important role. The religious right has a strong hold in tobacco-growing states and probably does 
not want to tread on the toes of its supporters. Conservative Christian lobbies and denominations 
also get a considerable part of their support from communities which are dependent on tobacco 
companies. According to Steve Sumerel, the director of the North Carolina Baptist State 
Substance Abuse and Family Division, many churches would go under if tobacco income was no 
longer donated to the church.118
 In some cases the tobacco industry has tried to silence anti-tobacco ministers. Some years 
ago Forest Jones, then a youth minister in Raleigh, North Carolina, committed himself to fighting 
youth smoking. When he moved to a church some counties away, he got a very unpleasant call 
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from a local officer of a tobacco company. The officer, who was in the management of the 
company wanted to know whether Jones was there to pastor or to make trouble.119
 President Clinton announced his plans to regulate tobacco through the FDA at the 
Progressive National Convention at Charlotte, North Carolina.  I think Clinton chose a religious 
setting in the hope that religious groups would support his measures against tobacco. Clinton 
underscored that an anti-tobacco commitment would be a part of any family agenda by calling 
smoking, drugs, violence, and teen pregnancy "the four deadly sins that are threatening our 
children". But as we have seen, the religious right has not been willing to include the fight 
against smoking among its family values.120  
 I think Republican senator Jesse Helms can be said to be an incarnation of the paradoxical 
pro-life and pro-tobacco stance of the Republican Party. He is a devoted supporter of the tobacco 
industry, while simultaneously promoting a pro-life view. The North Carolinian senator, who 
finds homosexuality a threat to public health, seems to be blind to the health hazards of tobacco. 
There are even indications that Helms has helped the tobacco industry keep an eye on pro-life 
groups. In connection with the 1989 search for a new Surgeon General, a Philip Morris lobbyist 
informed his superiors that "the pro-life community has coalesced around a Massachusetts 
physician who had assured Senator Helms she had no strong anti-tobacco bias."121
 Helms's tobacco view contrasts strongly with the anti-tobacco commitment of the 
conservative Dr. Elisabeth Whelan. Whelan, who has a master's degree in public health from 
Yale and a doctorate from Harvard, opened her own enterprise, the American Councils on 
Science and Health, in 1978, with the purpose of educating consumers. Smoking was one of her 
council's major issues.  Among other things, Whelan brought into focus how the US government 
had been pouring surplus American tobacco into the Third World, disguising it as economic aid. 
Whelan found that fellow conservatives were unable to deal with the smoking problem "Due to 
their doctrinaire distaste for government intervention in matters best left to private resolution." 
She therefore reached out to them, in part through in the Wall Street Journal. Whelan was 
specially disturbed by the fact that many of her fellow conservatives were pro-life on the abortion 
issue and anti-life on the tobacco issue. There seems to be a latent conflict in the GOP between 
the "Helmses" and the "Whelans". One of the causes of the religious right regarding the tobacco 
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issue might be the fear of making this conflict come to light. For the time being there seems to be 
more "Helmses" than "Whelans" in the Republican Party. 
 The tobacco industry is aware of this potential conflict within the GOP, and it has 
therefore taken measures in order to prevent it from bursting out. The tobacco industry has made 
efforts to stigmatize smoking restrictions, tobacco taxes and tobacco regulation as violations of 
Republican ideology. Coalitions with grassroots groups have been one way to achieve this 
stigmatization. Since the Republican party traditionally has been advocating individual rights, it 
was important for the industry to establish smoking as a personal/liberty issue and not a health 
issue. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a smoker's movement emerged in the USA However, in 
the mid-nineties it was revealed that this movement was staged by the tobacco industry to fight 
smoking restrictions.  In 1993 Philip Morris had hired one of the world's largest public relations 
firms, Burson Marteller, to create the National Smoker's alliance (NSA).122 The NSA's annual 
reports to the Internal Revenue Service for the first three years showed that less than 1% of its 
income came from membership dues, 96 % of the NSA's funds came from Philip Morris.123
 Such embarrassing revelations caused the tobacco companies to gradually change focus; 
instead of supporting groups with an explicit pro-tobacco agenda it increasingly cooperates with 
groups that ostensibly have nothing to do with tobacco. Such coalitions may give an industry 
with an increasingly negative image useful cover and transform it from a "black hat to a white hat 
in the political world".124 In this respect coalitions with anti-tax groups were very favorable to 
the industry. A former tobacco industry field coordinator put it the following way: "You did not 
have to defend your position on tobacco, because a tax is a tax is a tax to these people. They don't 
care what it is."125 The tobacco industry has forged ties to several anti-tax groups, among others 
Americans for Tax reform, The National Taxpayers Union, and for a Sound Economy. Some of 
these groups are also funded by the tobacco industry. Philip Morris granted between $100,000 
and $200,000 to the Citizens for a Sound Economy in the early 1990s. R.J. Reynolds also gave an 
unknown amount of direct funds to the CSE in this period. David Keating, the Director of the 
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National Taxpayers Union, also admits to having received "significant" contributions from Philip 
Morris.126
 Tobacco supported anti-tax groups pressed for the killing of Clinton's proposal to raise 
excise taxes on tobacco to 75 cents per pack in order to help pay for the health care reform.127 
Such groups were also strongly opposed to the proposed tax on tobacco inherent in the McCain 
bill.128 As we saw in the previous chapter, the Republican Party argued that it had to kill the 
McCain bill because of its "tax and spend aspects." Republican senators who were positive to 
broad tobacco legislation were put under strong pressure from anti-tax groups and conservative 
Republicans to come to this conclusion. This is illustrated by a letter to Congress from four "the 
presidential Hopefuls", Lamar Alexander, John Ashcroft, (later Attorney General in the Bush 
administration), Steve Forbes, and Jack Kemp. The letter, which claims that the McCain bill 
violates Republican ideology, was conceived and coordinated by the National Taxpayers Union. 
(The NTU claims to be a nonpartisan citizen group unconnected with any industry or 
corporation.) Alexander, Forbes, and Kemp urged Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich to reject the tobacco legislation that was pending in the Senate in 1998. 
The four Republicans contended that "all true fiscal conservatives should feel compelled to speak 
out against any legislation that would raise taxes by three-quarters of a trillion dollars, create 17 
new federal bureaucracies, intrude into the personal lives of Americans to an unprecedented 
degree, and serve as cover for billions of dollars in pork barrel spending". The fact that the 
McCain bill was aimed at tobacco was no reason to sway from the principle. The senators argued 
that Congress might target other industries for tax increase later on if the McCain bill was 
implemented. According to John Berthoud, President of National Taxpayers' Union, the purpose 
of the letter was to make it clear to Congressional leaders that many prominent Republican 
leaders were obstinately opposed to higher taxes, regardless of the form they might take. Those 
senators and the NTU found it ironical that Members of Congress who had had sharply 
condemned President Clinton's tax hike in 1993 were leading the charge for exactly the same 
thing in 1998, in the form of tobacco legislation.129  
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 Alexander, Ashcroft, Forbes, and Kemp claimed that "would-be tax-hikers" in Congress 
risked selling their political souls for legislation that was nothing more than a "Cash cow for 
special interests who want a bigger place at the federal trough."  The letter also warned Members 
of Congress of the political consequences of passing the tobacco bill. Congress was reminded 
that the GOP gained control of both houses in the wake of President Clinton's $240 billion tax 
hike. The authors of the letter argued that the GOP would lose the support of the American 
people if it strayed away from the principles of tax-spending restraint.130
 Jack Kemp said that his decision to sign the letter was motivated out of deep concern for 
the ideological roots of the Republican party. He contended that the GOP would send the wrong 
message to taxpayers and consumers if it did not stand up to the McCain bill. It is interesting to 
note that the four Republicans urged Congress to "return to its agenda of the early days of the 
Republican Revolution - cutting wasteful spending, eliminating unneeded agencies, turning 
programs back to the states and providing substantial tax relief to all Americans."131 It seems that 
the "anti-regulatory, anti-tax and individual freedom ideology of the "Contract with America" 
pressed anti-tobacco Republicans to turn down the tobacco bill. This ideology also prevented 
pro-tobacco Republicans from being stigmatized because of their pro-tobacco view. 
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THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S INFLUENCE IN CONGRESS DURING 
CLINTON'S TENURE 
 
Congress staved off many Clinton-backed steps against smoking in the 1990's. In this chapter I 
will examine how the tobacco industry used its enormous economic power to influence Congress 
in this direction. I will also try to detect possible differences between Republican and Democratic 
members of Congress when it comes to tobacco contributions from tobacco companies and 
attitudes towards tobacco control legislation. 
 As early as 1964, the Surgeon General had certified that smoking caused serious disease as early 
as 1964. The unimpressive list of tobacco control laws passed by Congress throughout the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s was by no means in keeping with tobacco's heavy toll. Anti-tobacco laws 
passed in this period would actually fit on a packet of cigarettes: Congress had forbidden tobacco 
advertisement on radio and TV, increased the excise tax, required stronger warning labels on 
cigarette packs, and prohibited smoking on commercial airline flights.132
 It is interesting to note that these laws had the eventual support of the tobacco companies. 
Two of them actually turned out to be of great advantage to the industry. The prohibition of 
tobacco commercials on the airwaves prevented new tobacco companies from establishing 
themselves, and warning labels on cigarette packets were to help the tobacco manufacturers 
defeat sick smokers in court.133
 Studies carried out in the 1990s showed that cancer and other tobacco-related illnesses 
killed at least 400,000 Americans each year, which was more than alcohol, drugs, violence, auto 
accidents and AIDS altogether.134 Research also showed that 3,000 teenagers started smoking 
daily, and that one third of these people were to die from diseases related to smoking.135  
Notwithstanding these alarming facts, Congress turned down America's first anti-smoking 
president's attempt to curb youth smoking. 
 A tobacco industry executive once said: "We have more money than God." One might 
tend to agree with him when learning about the ever-increasing amounts of money that the 
                                                          
132 "The Inhalers" Common Cause Magazine (1995) 8 pp Online. Internet. 4 Aug. 2000 
133 Kluger, Richard. "Ashes to Ashes, America's Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed 
Triumph of Philip Morris". New York: Knopf, 1996. 
134 "The Inhalers"  Common Cause Magazine (1995) 8 pp Online. Internet. 4 Aug. 2000 
 40
tobacco industry spread to members of Congress in the 1990s.136 From 1986 to 1995, 14 tobacco 
companies and lobbying groups, along with their executives gave $11.6 million in political action 
committee contributions (PACs) and $9 million in soft money contributions. (PACs are usually 
organized by a company or a labor union to solicit personal campaign contributions from 
employees. Soft money is contributions to party committees for "party building" activities 
theoretically unrelated to candidates. These contributions are outside the limits of federal law. 
Hard money on the other hand, are contributions that are legal under federal law for federal 
elections.)  
 It is interesting to note that soft money and PAC contributions from tobacco companies 
skyrocketed in 1995, the year when FDA claimed to have jurisdiction over tobacco products. 
Tobacco interests flooded Congress and the two political parties with a record of $4,124,041 in 
soft money and PAC contributions, a doubling compared to 1993.137 Philip Morris and RJR 
Nabisco were the two top soft money donors to the Republican Party in 1995 and 1996, ranking 
far above American Financial Group which occupied the third place.138 Tobacco PACs granted 
$841,120 to Republican candidates in 1995, twice as much as in 1993. 82 percent of all members 
of Congress in 1995 had received tobacco PAC Contributions during the past decade.139
 Tobacco contributions augmented still more in 1997 and 1998. In 1997, the year when 
state attorneys general negotiated the so-called "global settlement", the tobacco industry put $4.5 
million into congressional campaign chests. If accepted by Congress, the 1997 settlement would 
have given the industry immunity from future lawsuits seeking to hold tobacco manufacturers 
responsible for smoking related deaths.140 In 1998, Congress attempted to draft national tobacco 
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legislation based on the 1997 settlement. When this tobacco bill, sponsored by moderate 
Republican Senator John McCain, developed into a strong pro-health bill that did not grant the 
tobacco companies immunity from future liability suits, the industry withdraw their support for 
the bill. In just the first six months of the congressional election year 1998, tobacco interests 
spent $5.6 million in soft money and PAC contributions.141  
 The tobacco industry also had other ways of showing favor to Congress. In addition to 
being a frequent flier of Congressmen to sunny resort places, the tobacco companies also 
provided the use of their corporate aircraft to congressional leaders for campaign activities. A 
study carried out in 1998 showed that the tobacco industry supplied congressional leaders and 
political parties with more subsidized campaign travel than other corporate special interests. 
According to federal election law, members of Congress must reimburse these travels at the cost 
of first class or charter airfare. However, these luxurious travels, which gave the tobacco industry 
an excellent opportunity to lobby important members of Congress, cost the tobacco industry from 
15 to 45 times more than a first-class airfare. 142
 Is there any connection between tobacco contributions and Congress members' attitudes 
to tobacco issues? Several studies carried out in the mid-1990s found a high correlation between 
congressional votes cast in tobacco legislation and tobacco contributions. In 1996, Smoke Free 
Action released a report which disclosed voting records and tobacco contributions accepted by 
every member of the 104th Congress. The report presented votes that would have prevented the 
release of FDA regulations and proposed OSHA smoke free workplace regulations and bills that 
would have granted the industry immunity from lawsuits. The House votes on tobacco subsidies 
and signed statements opposing or supporting FDA regulations aimed at curbing youth smoking 
were also included. 
 The Smoke free Action report graded members of Congress on a scale from 0 to 100, 0 
representing the top score of pro-tobacco votes, and 100 representing the top score of anti-
tobacco votes. The 80 House members who scored 0 had accepted an average of $7,801 from 
                                                          
141 "Big Tobacco lobbying Costs $ 81, 000 Per member of Congress in First Half of 1998." Public Citizen 
Prairielaw.journal (1998): 3 pp Online. Internet. 10 Sept. 1999. 
http://www.prairielaw.com/journal/articles/tobacco.shtml 
142 "The Inhalers "  Common Cause Magazine  (1995) 8 pp Online. Internet. 4 Aug.  000 "Democrats: GOP big on 
"Air Tobacco." USA TODAY ( 2000) : 3 pp Online. Internet. 14 Aug. 2000 "Air tobacco: Campaign Travel on 
Tobacco Industry Jets." Minority Staff Report Commmittee on Government Reform and oversight, U.S. House of 
Representatives. (20 Jul.. 1998) : 2 pp Online. Internet.  4 Mar.2001 
 42
tobacco PACs from January 1995 to October 1996. The House members who scored 100 had 
received an average of $119.  The 23 senators who scored 0 had received an average of $10,293, 
while the 28 senators who scored 100 had received an average of $429.143
  An ABC News.com analysis of 1997 tobacco measures also found a clear connection 
between tobacco contributions and voting records. Members of Congress who financed their 
campaigns with tobacco contributions voted in favor of the tobacco industry 9 to 15 times more 
than those who refused to accept tobacco contributions. The 105 House members who voted with 
the tobacco industry had received an average of $7,900 in contributions. That was nine times the 
average of $869 received by 138 Representatives who always cast votes against the tobacco 
industry The 12 senators who most often sided with the tobacco companies received an average 
of $32,000 between 1991 and 1996, more than 15 times the average of $2,031 received by the 15 
senators who always voted in disfavor of the industry.144
 Protests against FDA's regulation of tobacco, in the form of a letter signed by 32 senators 
and a letter signed by 124 House members, also show that there is a connection between tobacco 
contributions and Congress members' attitudes towards tobacco issues. The 32 senators who had 
signed the letter had received an average of  $31,368 in tobacco PAC contributions between 1986 
and 1996. The senators, who did not sign the letter, had received an average of $11,819 during 
the period. The 124 Representatives who objected to the FDA had been granted an average of 
$19,446 in tobacco PAC contributions between 1986 and 1996. Representatives who did not sign 
the letter had received $6,728, on average in this period. 84 House members signed a letter in 
support of FDA regulation. These Representatives had received an average of $1,705 in the ten-
year period.145
 The tobacco industry also exerts considerable influence on Congress by hiring high-
priced, high-influence lobbyists. In the first half of 1998, for example, the tobacco industry spent 
$43 million on lobbying, of $81,000 for each member of Congress. The purpose of this intensive 
campaign was to make Congress accept the industry's version of the McCain bill. When 
immunity from liability was slashed from the bill, the tobacco industry successfully lobbied 
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against it. Many ex-congressional staff members and former members of the House and Senate 
lobby for the industry. This "revolving door phenomenon" gives the tobacco industry a unique 
access to powerful members of Congress.146
 
Embracing the Republican Congress in the mid 1990s 
In the following section I will consider how Republican Congress members were embraced 
tighter by the tentacles of the tobacco industry in the mid-1990s. I think this embrace to a large 
extent was triggered by Food and Drug Administration Commissioner David Kessler's interest in 
nicotine. In February 1994, Kessler informed Congress that his agency would consider regulating 
nicotine as a drug if there existed evidence that the tobacco companies intended nicotine's effects. 
Regulation of tobacco by the FDA could not only have affected the industry's marketing 
methods. In a long-run objective, it could have affected the content of nicotine in cigarettes and, 
theoretically, it could have led to a prohibition of tobacco. If there was evidence that the tobacco 
industry intentionally hooked customers, this could also have been an important weapon against 
the industry in liability suits.147
 Kessler's 1994 letter to Congress took the industry by surprise. The commissioner's 
address led to congressional hearings on tobacco. These hearings, led by the leader of the House 
Subcommittee on Health and Environment, Democratic Representative Henry Waxman, 
disclosed many industry secrets and generally made the tobacco industry appear in an adverse 
light. The tobacco industry was for instance put up to public ridicule when seven tobacco 
executives declared that they did not believe that nicotine was addictive and that they were not 
sure whether smoking caused disease and death. The Waxman hearings also caused 
whistleblowers to come forward and reveal what they knew about the industry's manipulation of 
nicotine.  And eventually, the hearings spurred the FDA to claim the right to regulate tobacco as 
a delivery mechanism for the drug nicotine.148
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 The tobacco industry called its allies into play during the Waxman hearings. Tobacco 
industry PACs had given eighteen of the members of the House Subcommittee on Health and 
Environment more than half a million dollars since 1995. The ranking minority leader of 
Waxman's subcommittee, Virginia Republican Thomas Bliley, for example, had received 
$111,476 in tobacco PAC contributions since 1985, more than any member of Congress. Prior to 
the hearings, the FDA received a letter from Bliley, where he asked for evidence that the tobacco 
manufacturers intended that cigarettes were to contain enough nicotine to hook smokers. FDA 
commissioner David Kessler was later to obtain a Philip Morris document dating to this period 
that listed "letter to Kessler from Bliley" as one of its items. 
  During Kessler's testimony on nicotine addiction to Waxman's subcommittee in March 
1994, one could almost perceive "the presence" of the tobacco industry. Bliley, who had been 
called "our sentry in that committee" by an official in Philip Morris' government affairs office, 
blasted Kessler for having leveled serious accusations against the tobacco industry. When Bliley 
interrogated Kessler about nicotine manipulation, he used a prepared text. Kessler later learned of 
Phlip Morris's plans to provide "questions to Bliley for use in examining Kessler."149  
 The Republicans were stronger in number during the June 1994 hearings.  Bliley was 
flanked by Michael Bilirakis of Florida, Alex McMillian of North Carolina, Gary Franks of 
Connecticut, James Greenwood of Pennsylvania, and Dennis Hastert of Illinois. In connection 
with Kessler's testimony about nicotine manipulation, Bilirakis, hailed by Hastert and McMillian, 
presented a document request to Kessler concerning FDA's sources. The tobacco industry can be 
said to have been "present" also this time. Bilirakis's questions turned out to have been prepared 
by R.J.Reynolds. Philip Morris was also "present" in the June hearings. An internal memo 
stamped “confidential,” proved that the company had developed a "Kessler Hearing Checklist": 
The memo read: "Require Kessler to give over documents (e.g., notes of interviews) related to his 
investigation, prepare a line of narrowly tailored hostile questions. Brief friendly members and 
staff and prepare them to ask hostile questions (Kessler 249-250) 
 The threat of regulation by the FDA, of which Clinton announced his support in 1995, 
probably spurred the industry to pin its faith on the Republicans in the 1994 congressional 
elections. The tobacco industry was the single largest contributor to the GOP during this election 
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session. Tobacco interests granted as much as $600,000 to the Republican National 
Committee.150 The industry evidently hoped that the anti-regulatory spirit of "The Contract with 
America" would shield it from regulation. 
 The Republican landslide of 1994 turned out to be of great advantage to the tobacco 
industry. Many Democratic anti-tobacco Congress members were replaced by Republican allies 
of the industry. The heading of John Schwartz's election analysis for the Washington Post read: 
"Good-bye, Henry, Hello, Tom! Philip Morris breathes easier." Schwartz referred to the fact that 
leader of the Health and Environment Subcommittee, Henry Waxman, had lost his seat and that 
Thomas Bliley had taken control of its parent, the Commerce Committee. Shortly after the 
elections, Bliley declared that his committee would not consider tobacco control legislation.151 
Long-time tobacco ally, Florida Republican Michael Bilirakis, who had received $38,700 in PAC 
contributions from the industry since 1985, replaced Waxman.152
 House speaker of the 104th Congress, Georgia Republican Newt Gingrich, was a severe 
critic of the FDA. Shortly after the elections, Gingrich called FDA commissioner a "bully and a 
thug". Gingrich, who was often observed in a RJR Nabisco jet, had received $41,000 in campaign 
contributions since 1985. RJR Nabisco had also contributed at least $50,000 to GOPAC, 
Gingrich's political action committee.153
 Key anti-tobacco Democratic congressman Mike Synar lost his seat in the 1994 elections. 
The tobacco industry had worked hard to oust Synar in 1992.  Manpower and money had been 
poured into Oklahoma in an attempt to defeat Synar in a Democratic primary.  Negative 
advertisement, like billboards juxtaposing Synar's face to Hitler, Stalin and Castro, was an 
important weapon in the attempt to get rid of Synar. The Oklahoma Democrat won the primary 
and the general election in 1992, but considerable damage had been done. The tobacco industry 
was less visible in the 1994 elections. The gun lobby and ranching interests completed the job the 
tobacco industry had started in 1992. The advocate of both tobacco regulation and gun control 
lost his seat after 16 years in office (Kessler 282) 
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 Last-minute tobacco industry contributions to Republican Party committees and 
candidates helped many pro-tobacco candidates win seats in Congress. Pennsylvania Senator 
Rick Santorum's defeat of health care advocate Harris Woffard was partly financed by $29,500 
from tobacco companies. $22,000 in tobacco industry money helped Mike de Wine (R-OH) 
replace anti-tobacco senator Howard Metzenbaum.154
 The FDA was exposed to severe attacks from many tobacco-friendly Republican 
members of the 104th congress. One example is the debate over the construction of a modern 
FDA headquarters. The agency was spread over forty-eight buildings in twenty different 
locations around Washington. The construction of the new FDA headquarters had enjoyed 
bipartisan support in 1992, and Congress had started setting aside construction funds. In 1995, 
some members of the House Appropriations Committee launched an attack on the building 
project.  Republican John Duncan characterized the planned FDA quarters as a "Taj Mahal" and 
proposed a bill that would kill the project. Ohio Republican John Boehner remarked that 
Congress would downsize the FDA so much the coming years that what would be left of it would 
easily be placed into some empty buildings. Boehner was reported to have been distributing 
checks from Brown & Williamson on the floor of the House, in violation of House rules. The 
FDA building request was killed by a vote of 278-146 (Kessler 316) 
 It is interesting to note that The Citizens for a Sound Economy, an organization which 
urged Congress to kill the building process, had close ties to the tobacco industry. During his 
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Boyden Gray, the chairman of the CSE, 
criticized the FDA for a slow drug approval process despite the fact that the approval process had 
speeded up during Kessler's tenure. Boyden, whose organization received ample contributions 
from tobacco interests, even questioned the existence of the FDA.155
 David Nicoli, the head of government affairs at Philip Morris, had been watching the 
killing of the FDA building project. The moment the bill was killed, Nicoli e-mailed his friends. 
He noted that "tobacco was not mentioned during the debate and that CSE orchestrated this and 
wrote most of the statements that were read against the FDA" (Kessler 316) 
 The following day, however, tobacco was mentioned in the House. When Kentucky 
Republican Jim Bunning proposed to strike all funding for the FDA, California Republican John 
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Riggs uttered the following: "The reason for this amendment is one reason and one reason only, 
and that is that the FDA in the face of overwhelming medical and scientific evidence is on the 
verge of classifying nicotine as an addictive substance. Bunning, who ranked number five on the 
list top House tobacco PAC recipients from 1986-1995, withdrew the amendment (Kessler 317-
318) 
 After the killing of the FDA building request, David Nicoli, the head of government 
affairs at Philip Morris, e-mailed his friends that the next step was to get the company's view of 
what the vote meant to the White House. The disappointment must have been great for the 
tobacco companies when President Clinton announced his support of the FDA Regulations aimed 
at curbing youth smoking in 1995. This act probably spurred the tobacco industry to forge even 
closer ties to the Republican Party. The GOP received $2,257,259 in tobacco industry soft money 
in 1995, while the Democratic Party received $423,962. Tobacco PACs contributed $841,221 to 
Republicans in 1995, compared to $422,221 in 1993. Contributions to Democratic congressional 
candidates declined to $281,000 in 1995 from $477,022 in 1993.156
 Clinton's initiative combined with revelations of highly questionable industry methods 
fostered pessimism and confusion among Republican tobacco allies. The heavy focus on tobacco 
issues made it difficult to be a quiet supporter of the industry.  A campaign against members of 
Congress who accepted tobacco money tended to hurt Republicans more than Democrats, 
considering that tobacco PACs had doubled their contributions to Republican members of 
Congress in 1995, compared to 1993. One of Philip Morris's most trusted advisors wrote that the 
Republicans believed that "being involved with or having to vote on these issues will hurt anyone 
other than tobacco state representatives."157
 Philip Morris decided to make it easier for its allies. A few weeks before President 
Clinton announced his support for FDA's plan to regulate tobacco, Philip Morris launched Action 
Against Access, a series of voluntary initiatives ostensibly aimed at curbing youth smoking. The 
measures against youth smoking offered by the AAA were weaker than the rules proposed by the 
FDA. The AAA focused on restricting sales to children. The program did not contain any 
restrictions in tobacco advertising. The Action Against Access was an attempt to take the youth 
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issue away from Kessler and the White House and last but not least, it was meant to provide 
industry allies with cover. A Philip Morris document about AAA read “they will not be as much 
on the defense, and can attack FDA's move as a prime example of big government action aimed 
at adults.” 
 The confusions and pessimism among pro-tobacco Republican Congress members were 
to increase further after Bill Clinton's defeat of pro-tobacco presidential candidate, Bob Dole. For 
the first time, tobacco had been an issue in a presidential election. Clinton had tried to link the 
Republican party to the tobacco industry and Dole had seemed to verify Clinton's contention 
when refusing to say that nicotine was addictive. The general focus on youth smoking and 
tobacco contributions in the presidential election made it more difficult for Congress members to 
take up a pro-tobacco stance.158
 The tobacco industry had for many years assumed that Congress would pass stricter 
tobacco control. A 1988 Philip Morris memo showed that the company might have agreed to 
include informational inserts in its cigarette packets, stop using vending machines, and limit the 
use of billboards near schools. However, the tobacco company concluded: "It would be a mistake 
to take any of these actions voluntarily at this time, because each of them may constitute an 
important bargaining chip in the legislative negotiations which are likely to come within the next 
two years. Since Congress did not take any steps to pass stricter tobacco controls, the industry did 
not take any initiative to change their marketing methods.159
 The $368 billion deal in 1997 between the tobacco industry and 40 state attorneys general 
illustrated the fact that the tobacco companies were willing to accept regulation if it could get 
something in return.  The industry was ready to swallow measures against youth smoking if 
given immunity from future class-action suits and punitive damages. The tobacco companies 
pinned their faith on the Republican Congress turning the 1997 settlement into federal law. In 
order to win the favor of doubtful Republicans, former Republican presidential candidate Bob 
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Dole was "enlisted" in the "army" of 192 tobacco lobbyists who flooded Congress in this 
period.160  
The fact that the 1997 tobacco deal focused on smoking among adolescents provided 
useful cover for Republican industry allies. On the pretext of combating youth smoking, 
Republican allies were to grant the tobacco industry the immunity it wanted. This might explain 
why Newt Gingrich pronounced that he would not let President Clinton get to the left of him in 
the tobacco issue. When immunity from liability and punitive damages was slashed from the bill, 
the tobacco industry withdrew its support and a $40 billion advertisement campaign was 
launched to kill the tobacco bill.  As soon as the tobacco industry had cold-shouldered the 
tobacco legislation, the Republicans did the same. Suddenly most GOP senators were not so 
concerned with youth smoking any more. The McCain bill was stamped "tax and spend" and was 
voted down. Forty-three Republican senators voted against the bill, whereas thirteen GOP 
senators voted in its favor.161
 The tobacco companies and its congressional allies alike were worried that the voters 
would punish the Republicans for having killed the tobacco bill in the 1998 congressional 
elections. Even if the tobacco bill was defeated in June, the tobacco industry continued to run the 
ads which portrayed the tobacco bill as an attempt to raise higher taxes on ordinary Americans. 
There are indications that the tobacco companies continued the advertisement blitz in order to 
provide cover for the Republicans in the November elections. Kentucky Senator Mitch 
McConnell reportedly reassured fellow members that tobacco industry officials had promised to 
keep running the ads through the November election as cover for Republicans who had voted 
down the bill. These advertisements showed working class people worrying about higher taxes. 
The honest-sounding workers threatened to punish those at the ballot box who dare raise taxes. 
According to a Senate Republican aid, the tobacco industry had earmarked $60 million to keep 
the campaign on the air through the November elections.162
                                                          
160 Beer, Omar and Herel, Suzanne." Loan Officer for the Corporate Welfare State." MoJoWire: 4 pp ( 23 Apr. 
1997) Online. Internet.  8 Apr. 2001 
http://bsd. mojones.com7news wire/loan  officer.html 
161  
162 Weisman, Jonathan. "U.S. probing link of GOP votes, tobacco ads." Bergen Record Corp. ( 30 Aug. 1998 ): 4 pp 
Online. Internet. 29 Jun. 1999  
http://www.bergen.com/campaign/tobac30199808303.htm 
 50
 The advertisement campaign seemed to be directed at states in which Republicans were in 
tight races. In Missouri, where Republican Senator Christopher S. Bord had an uncertain 
position, the ads had appeared 1,847 times through July 18. In Nevada, where Rep. John Ensign 
was attempting to unseat Democratic senator Harry Reid, the ads had been showed 1,418 times. 
In Georgia, where Republican Senator Paul Coverdell was engaged in a re-election campaign, the 
ads ran 1,113 times between April 1 and July 18. In New York, on the other hand, where 
Republican Senator Alphonse D`Amato was distancing himself from the tobacco industry, the 
ads were shown 376 times. In Maryland, which was represented with two firmly established 
Democrats, the ads were aired 273 times.163
 Tobacco representatives and Republicans alike severely denied to have colluded to 
torpedo the McCain bill. Industry spokesman Steve Duchesne characterized the advertising 
campaign as a "straightforward, factual advertising effort against higher taxes."Senator 
McConnell also repudiated the accusations of a quid pro quo. He denied to have had assurances 
from the tobacco industry before the vote on the tobacco bill. According to McConnell's 
spokesman, Robert Steurer, the senator had only stated what was obvious, namely that it was in 
the interest of the tobacco industry to keep the ads running.164  
 However, even observers who were considered sympathetic towards the industry saw a 
political connection between the killing of the McCain bill and the advertising campaign. 
According to tobacco analyst at Sandford & Bernstein, Gary Black, it was beyond question that 
the tobacco industry kept the ads on the air to provide cover for the Republicans.165
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CONGRESSIONAL DEMOCRATS DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM 
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY IN THE MID-1990s 
 
In the following, I will examine the relationship between the tobacco industry and Democratic 
members of Congress during President Clinton's second tenure. I will also consider how 
Democratic disagreement concerning tobacco regulation gradually developed into agreement 
about a national platform calling for comprehensive tobacco legislation.  
 Democratic members of Congress in the mid-1990s counted both opponents and allies of 
the tobacco industry, a fact that is illustrated by the contrasting view on FDA's plans of 
regulating tobacco. While Congressmen like Henry Waxman (California), Richard Durbin 
(Illinois), and Mike Synar (Oklahoma) welcomed regulation, industry allies from tobacco-
growing states launched harsh attacks against FDA's initiative. The Chairman of the House 
Agriculture Committee, North Carolina Senator Charlie Rose, was among the Democrats who 
were highly critical towards Kessler's initiative.166 Some days before the FDA regulations were 
announced; Rose declared that the regulatory proposal was "the equivalent of declaring war on 
North Carolina." 167
  The tobacco industry had a very close relationship with its Democratic Congressional 
allies. In Connection with the 1994 Congressional Waxman hearings on tobacco, Rose sent the 
FDA a document request concerning FDA's investigation on nicotine. FDA Commissioner 
Kessler later discovered that this request had been written by Philip Morris.168 Charlie Rose, who 
had received $100,800 from tobacco PACs between 1985 and 1995, later became a tobacco 
lobbyist. Democratic South Carolina Representative Martin Lancaster was also bitterly opposed 
to FDA regulation of tobacco. Lancaster leveled caustic criticism of the FDA during the Waxman 
hearings on tobacco in March 1994. The Carolina Congressman was soon rewarded for his 
loyalty. The following month top Philip Morris executives were called upon to make personal 
donations to his election campaign. Lancaster lost his seat despite the support of the tobacco 
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industry. Shortly after his defeat, Lancaster wrote a letter to President Clinton, asserting that the 
Democrats would never reclaim the "tobacco south" if the FDA were permitted to move forward 
towards regulation of tobacco products." Virginia Senator Chuck Robbs also asked the White 
House to announce that the FDA did not have the jurisdiction to regulate tobacco.169
 In January 1996, Virginia Representative Lewis Payne, who ranked third on the list of top 
House recipients of tobacco PAC contributions between 1986 and 1995, published a letter which 
objected to the FDA regulation plan. 124 representatives signed the letter. In the Senate, 
Republican North Carolina Representative Jesse Helms and Kentucky Democrat Wendell Ford 
released a similar letter, which was signed by 32 Senators. Ford and Helms were the two top 
recipients of tobacco PAC contributions between 1996 and 1995.170
 Gradually, many Congressional Democrats were taking up an anti-tobacco stance. This 
development was probably spurred by revelations of dubious tobacco industry methods like 
nicotine manipulation and the industry's attempts to conceal that tobacco caused serious disease. 
Polls also showed that a majority of the electorate favored regulations of tobacco products if 
aimed at curbing youth smoking. President Clinton announced his support to FDA's final rules in 
August 1996. Tobacco regulation was establishing itself as a Democratic cause to which most 
congressional  members wished to be loyal.  
 Anxiety about being punished at the polls had for years frightened many Democratic 
politicians from taking on the tobacco industry. Such fear had prompted President Carter to fire 
his anti-tobacco secretary John Califano. As showed in Chapter one, Bill Clinton had also 
experienced this fear at first hand. The fact that the president had introduced the tobacco issue in 
his presidential campaign and still was re-elected probably liberated many congressional 
candidates from the fear of "death by tobacco."  
 Democratic House leader Richard Gephardt might be said to be an epitome of the 
development outlined above. The Missouri Congressman, who had received $67,258 from 
tobacco PACs between 1986 and 1995, had worked hard to block FDA regulations. Gephardt had 
also urged President Clinton not to take on tobacco. However, under pressure from his 
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constituents, Gephardt later supported the FDA rules. 171 In 1996, Gephardt decided against 
taking more tobacco money, after having received more than $80,000 from tobacco PACs. 172
 Democratic members of Congress were to be forged even closer together on the tobacco 
issue. In 1994, Gingrich's "Contract with America" had successfully nationalized Republican 
politics. The Democratic Party did the same prior to the 1998 congressional elections. A few big 
issues were picked: The patient's bill of rights, a minimum wage increase, campaign finance 
reform, and tobacco legislation. The Democratic unity on the tobacco issue was illustrated by the 
vote on the McCain bill in 1998. Forty Democratic Senators voted in favor of the bill. Only three 
senators voted against the bill, all from tobacco growing states (Kentucky Senator Wendell Ford, 
South Carolina Senator Hollings, and Virginia Senator Robb).173
 A shift in the Democratic electorate in the late 1990s seemed to have made the 
Democratic Party less dependent on "tobacco votes." Moderate Democratic members of Congress 
were recruited from agricultural areas in a decreasing number. This is demonstrated by the 
declining number of Blue Dogs, an alliance of mostly southern, mostly conservative House 
Democrats established in 1995.  Many staunch pro-tobacco House members were Blue Dogs, for 
instance Virginia Representative Vigil Goode, Jr. The Blue Dogs barely survived Clinton. In 
1997, for example, they gained six new members, but lost nine to retirement, defeat, and party 
switching.174
 Moderate Democratic Congress members were increasingly recruited from suburban 
areas in the late 1990s. Repulsed by the religious right dominance of the GOP many secular well-
to do suburban inhabitants switched to the Democratic Party. Moderate Democratic 
Representatives hailed from suburban areas were called New Dogs. In 1997 the New Democratic 
coalition counted 41 members, of which 50% were freshmen, while the Blue Dogs represented 
old industries; the New Dogs represented the high-tech industries.175
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SWAYING PUBLIC OPINION 
 
Exerting influence on the public in tobacco issues was an important element of the tobacco 
companies' counterattack on Clinton's moves against the tobacco industry. It was of vital 
importance to the tobacco companies to avoid anti-tobacco articles and exposes and to ensure 
that pro-tobacco views found their way into major media outlets. I will exemplify how the 
tobacco industry fought Clinton's measures against tobacco by means of pro-tobacco media 
citations fabricated by think tanks and other pro-tobacco organizations. Then I will try to reveal 
the influence that the tobacco industry exerts over the American mass media. I will consider how 
tobacco advertisement in the printed press influences the content of publications. I will also give 
examples of business synergy between the tobacco industry and media outlets and of how 
tobacco companies have suppressed anti-tobacco broadcasts by threatening television networks 
with legal proceedings. 
 
"Neutral" Mouthpieces of the Tobacco Industry 
 A large number of American organizations opposed Clinton's measures against smoking. These 
groups, which appeared to be neutral sources with no links to the tobacco companies, were often 
cited in the media. However, a closer scrutiny often revealed that the groups in question had been 
supported financially by the tobacco industry. Well aware of the tobacco companies' lack of 
credibility with the public, recipients and money-givers alike often tried to keep these ties secret. 
Linking its product to the Bill of rights has been a part of the stratagem of the tobacco industry. 
Tobacco advertising and "smokers' rights" have been passed off as expressions of civil liberties. 
(There is perhaps no mere coincidence that Philip Morris contributed $ 60 million to the biennial 
celebration of the Bill of Rights in 1991.)176  
 President Clinton disclaimed the association between smoking and civil rights. As 
governor of Arkansas, he vetoed a smokers' rights bill, characterizing it as an insult to authentic 
civil rights (Kluger 735). In 1996, Clinton endorsed the FDA rules limiting cigarette advertising 
aimed at minors, and taking the Environmental Protection Agency's 1993 report seriously, he 
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banned smoking in all federal buildings in 1997.177  For the president, the smoking issue was first 
and foremost a matter of health policy. 
 The view of the president was in sharp contrast with the position of the American Civil 
Liberties Union. The now 82 year’s old defender of individual rights opposed many of Clinton's 
measures against smoking. The ACLU, which refused to support non-smokers' rights, was a 
vigorous defender of smokers' rights. Clinton's attempts to curb youth smoking fell flat with the 
weighty organization. Denying that cigarette advertising entices young people to smoke, the 
ACLU opposed restrictions on cigarette advertising aimed at minors. Clinton stressed the 
importance of disclosing secret tobacco documents. The ACLU apparently did not find such a 
disclosure important. It turned a blind eye when the tobacco industry tried to silence whistle 
blowers like Jeff Wigand. It was in the interest of the tobacco companies to persuade the public 
to see smoking as a civil liberties issue rather than a health issue. One of the main purposes of the 
ACLU is educating the public about issues relating to the Bill of Rights; hence, the pro-tobacco 
advocacy of a heavyweight like the ACLU must have been extremely helpful in this respect.178
 The integrity of the American Civil Liberties Union regarding tobacco issues had been 
blemished in the mid 1990s. In 1993, it had been revealed that the ACLU had received money 
from cigarette companies. The American Civil Liberties Union had denied any connection 
between these contributions and the agency's position in tobacco issues. 179
 A book by investigative journalist and former ACLU employee John Fahs, published in 
1996, claimed exactly the opposite. (Cigarette Confidential: The unfiltered Truth about the 
Ultimate American Addiction). According to Fahs, the ACLU had tried to hide a relationship 
based on direct work for funding for with R.J.Reynolds and Philip Morris. Such a relationship 
was in conflict with ACLU's status as a tax-exempt, non-profit institution. From 1987, the agency 
had taken over $1,000,000 in donations from the tobacco cartel. ACLU's supporters had been 
assured that no single donor contributed a significant portion of ACLU's income. However, secret 
memos referred to in Fahs’ book showed that the tobacco industry was funding 90 % of ACLU's 
smokers' rights department and that Philip Morris was earmarking funds for seminars on smokers' 
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rights. ACLU claims not to seek or accept fees for its services. The memos brought to light by 
John Fahs revealed that bills for conferences, newspaper ads, and radio ads were constantly 
forwarded by ACLU to Philip Morris.180
 Before ACLU started to receive tobacco money, it did not oppose measures against 
smoking, such as smoke-free workplace laws and prohibition of cigarette sales to minors. Fahs 
claimed that ACLU had compromised its ideas to get more tobacco money. It is interesting to 
note that the ACLU and the tobacco companies used the same rhetoric. For instance, both groups 
used "workplace privacy" and "lifestyle choices" for smokers' rights. Fahs also claimed that the 
ACLU had tried to conceal its ties with the tobacco companies. It refused to open to the public or 
reporters parts of its 1994 board of directors meeting relating to tobacco issues. The press was 
constantly given misleading statements. A memo to Ira Glasser from ACLU's North Carolina 
affiliate exemplifies the secrecy of the contributions from the tobacco companies: "My 
microfiche shows a September 1991 $1.0000 RJR donation to ACLU- NJ foundation. Imagine 
RJR forgot to ask for anonymity."181
 Cigarette Confidential got little attention in 1996. Two years later, however, in the midst 
of the debate of the tobacco bill sponsored by John McCain, the tobacco industry was again 
exposed to public scrutiny. Former Washington Post reporter Morton Mintz referred to Cigarette 
Confidential in an article in the spring edition of Nieman Reports (published by the Nieman 
Foundation at Harvard University).  
 In April 1998, the ACLU and the tobacco companies were the topic of discussion of 
Making Contact, a radio program by the National Radio project. Morton Mintz and Stanton 
Glantz, professor of medicine of the University of California, participated in the program. Both 
had been members of ACLU for years. Executive director of the ACLU Ira Glasser had also been 
invited, but he had declined. An invitation to provide two spokespersons for the ACLU to appear 
in studio or by telephone had also been refused by the ACLU. A written statement was the 
ACLU's only contribution to the program.182
 When asked to recite the most important aspects of his article, Mintz pointed to the large 
sums that the American Civil Liberties Union had been taking from the tobacco companies from 
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1987 onwards. Mintz also claimed to have been misled by Ira Glasser in 1992. The executive 
director had assured Mintz that the tobacco contributions went into the general fund of the 
ACLU. Cigarette Confidential had revealed that tobacco contributions had been earmarked for 
advocacy in tobacco matters. Mintz also pointed to the way the ACLU had been fighting 
restrictions against tobacco advertising. He found it reprehensible that the ACLU placed 
commercial speech and human speech on the same footing and pointed to the fact that such a 
position had never been fully accepted by the Supreme Court. According to Mintz, the tobacco 
companies had benefited from the ACLU's testimony against restrictions on tobacco advertising 
in the McCain bill. The investigative reporter found it highly questionable that the ACLU was 
defending commercial speech that was designed to entice young people and adults to smoke.183
 Professor of medicine Stanton Glantz joins issue with Morton Mintz when it comes to 
criticizing how the ACLU was defending the marketing tactics of the tobacco industry. He was 
also highly critical to the ACLU's opposition to laws that would protect workers from second-
hand smoke. The professor of medicine claimed that the ACLU had provided a fig leaf for the 
tobacco companies to hide behind, as had other groups that had been created or funded by the 
industry. Glantz also described how the ACLU had refused to help him when he was trying to 
make public forty thousand pages of secret industry documents that had been sent to him 
anonymously. R.J. Reynolds had tried to sue the University of California in order to prevent the 
publication of the documents. According to Glantz, this was a clear First Amendment case. 
However, the ACLU, which always seemed to have time to defend the tobacco industry's right to 
pollute the air, did not have time to put in an Amicus brief in support of the University of 
California.184
 The written statement by Ira Glasser attacked the integrity of Morton Mintz and his 
sources. The executive director claimed that Fahs’ arguments in Cigarette Confidential did not 
hold up. Glasser did not comment on the key issues of Mintz's article, among others a statement 
by Melvin Wolf, who had been the ACLU's Legal Director for fifteen years. Wolf had 
characterized the information in Cigarette Confidential as a threat to the basic integrity of the 
American Civil Liberties Union. He had also dissociated himself completely from the idea that 
polluting the air and threatening the health of others was a constitutional right. Both Glantz and 
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Mintz found it ironical that an organization whose purpose is to protect free speech and public 
discourse, refused to come and defend itself.185  
 The Washington-based Cato Institute might have been on Stanton Glantz's mind when he 
mentioned other groups which were providing a fig leaf for the tobacco industry. At first blush, 
the Cato Institute may seem like an independent think thank, doing legitimate research. However, 
a closer scrutiny reveals close ties between the Cato Institute and the tobacco industry. Philip 
Morris and R.J. Reynolds have been contributing amply to this conservative think tank for years. 
The Cato Institute, whose main purpose is fighting government regulation, sided with the tobacco 
industry in the controversies over smoking in the Clinton era. 
 In the late 1990s, the Cato Institute published an article which attacked data from the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The article, which was entitled "Lies, Damned Lies, 
& 400,000 Smoking-Related Deaths," denied that smoking was causing 400,000 deaths each 
year. According to the authors of the article, Rosalind Marimont and Robert Levy, the deaths 
caused by smoking were not premature deaths, but deaths caused by "old age". The Office on 
smoking and Health (OSH) responded to the article by pointing out that 33 percent of non-
smokers live until they are 85, compared with only 12 percent of smokers. The OSH also claimed 
that the data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention had been proved accurate by 
the state of Oregon. Between 1989 and 1996, the state of Oregon had kept track of death 
certificates which attributed the decedent's cause of death to smoking and found that 20 percent 
of its citizens died of tobacco use. This percentage was in concordance with data presented by the 
Centers for Disease Control and prevention.186
 The Cato article also attacked the Environmental Protection Agency's 1992 report about 
second-hand smoke and cancer. EPA was accused of having based the report on junk science. 
The Cato Article relied upon a decision by the US District Court for the middle district of North 
Carolina. According to the North Carolinian court, the Environmental Protection Agency had 
publicly supported a conclusion before doing research. (It is interesting to note that the tobacco 
industry took legal action against the Environmental Protection Agency in a state which is 
heavily dependent on the tobacco industry.)187
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 The Cato Institute’s attacks on the Centers for Disease and Prevention and the 
Environmental Protection Agency are in accordance with the tobacco companies' way of coping 
with research which proves health damage caused by tobacco use. Raising doubt about research 
which is unfavorable for the industry was an important tobacco industry stratagem in the 20th 
century. The Cato Institute can be said to have been an important mouthpiece for the tobacco 
companies in this respect. 
 The 1998 tobacco bill, sponsored by Senator John McCain, was one of Clinton's most 
important measures against the tobacco industry. The Cato Institute was strongly opposed to this 
bill, which is illustrated by Cato president Edward H. Crane's severe criticism of the 104th 
Congress. Crane found it outrageous that a Republican Congress had considered passing national 
tobacco legislation.188 In July 1997, Cato affiliate Robert Levy testified before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, calling the McCain bill a "shameful document, extorted by public officials 
who have perverted the rule of law to tap the deep pockets of a feckless and friendless industry." 
He also characterized the proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising as "draconian". The idea 
that the tobacco firms should contribute to children was also completely savaged by Levy. He 
called the proposal a bald transfer of wealth from a disfavored to a favored group.189
 According to FAIR's search of the most important newspaper and broadcast media in the 
Nexis computerbase, the Cato Institute was one of four think tanks with more than 1,000 citations 
in 1995 and 1996. American media outlets often cite the position of the Cato Institute in tobacco 
related issues, but Cato's ties to the tobacco industry rarely get mentioned. The pro-tobacco 
assessments of Cato Affiliate Robert A. Levy, for instance, got respectful media coverage.  A 
week before Levy testified on Capitol Hill, the Chicago Tribune opened its columns to Levy's 
views. The Cato Institute was described as "a libertarian think tank in the capital." One month 
later, the San Diego Union-Tribune published an article by Levy titled "Rule of Law Is a Loser in 
Tobacco War," in which he leveled strong criticism of an $11 billion settlement between Florida 
and the tobacco industry. Levy characterized the settlement as shameful and claimed that it 
deprived the tobacco industry of rights that the American citizens take for granted. The San 
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Diego Union-Tribune presented Levy as a "senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato 
Institute." Cato's ties to the tobacco industry were not mentioned.190
 The Cato Institute was also a strong opponent of the Food and Drug Administration, the 
agency which had proposed to regulate nicotine as a drug in 1994.  The FDA, which was led by 
Dr. David Kessler, had also pressed for restrictions on the sale of tobacco to minors and on 
advertising directed against youth. The FDA rules were endorsed by President Clinton in 1995. 
Chapter 32 of the Cato Handbook for Congress, which was entirely devoted to the FDA, urged 
Congress to "eliminate FDA regulations that undermine competitiveness and investment."191 The 
Cato institute was one of seven conservative think tanks which waged an aggressive public 
relations and lobbying campaign against the FDA in the 1990s. The other think tanks were: the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Progress and Freedom Foundation, the Heritage Foundation, 
the Hudson Institute, and the Washington Legal Foundation. Citizens for a Sound Economy, an 
anti-tax group, also joined the attack. The Food and Drug Administration was accused of being 
slow to approve lifesaving drugs and medical devices. The Washington Legal Foundation ran 
advertisements which said. “If the FDA kills you, it's just being cautious.” Citizens for a Sound 
Economy also sponsored similar ads: "A better quality of life--even life itself--is being denied to 
too many Americans because of the FDA's misplaced priorities." The Competitive Enterprise 
Institute launched a radical plan that would deprive the FDA of its power to veto new drugs and 
medical devices. Similarly the Progress and Freedom Foundation, which was an integral part of 
the then House speaker, Newt Gingrich's political network, proposed to replace the FDA with a 
private drug-approval system.192
 The attack on the FDA was based on misinformation and smear of the FDA. According to 
the US General Accounting Office, the FDA was approving drugs as fast or faster than similar 
agencies in the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany. The FDA was also more successful in 
keeping dangerous and lethal drugs off the American market than its counterparts in the countries 
mentioned.193
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 It is interesting to note that the proposals of the conservative think tanks mentioned above 
were more radical than the proposals of the drug and medical device manufacturers. Tom Lenard, 
the director of regulatory studies of the Progress & Freedom Foundation, admits that the drug 
companies are not particularly radical and that his think tank wants to go beyond where the drug 
and medical manufacturers would like to go. According to a top FDA official, the drug 
companies were happier under David Kessler than they had been in ten years. Under Kessler, the 
approval time was cut by 30 to 40 percent. The pharmaceutical industry was not behind the 
crusade against the FDA. This is illustrated by a statement by Jim Benson, senior vice president 
of the Health Industry Manufacturers association.  According to Benson, The medical device 
manufactures did not want to abolish or weaken the FDA.194
 So who were behind the attack on the FDA? We have already heard of the close 
relationship between the Cato Institute and the tobacco industry. A similar relationship exists 
between tobacco industry and the Washington Legal Foundation. The WLF is financed by the 
tobacco industry and Richard Mellon Scaife. Several pro-tobacco politicians are on the National 
board of Advisors of the Washington Legal Foundation. (Below I will write more about the ties 
the WLF and the other think tanks have to the tobacco industry). 
 
The Tobacco Companies and the American Media 
Press censorship is normally associated with non-democratic governments. Freedom of speech is 
a cherished principle in democratic countries. Given the free speech protections of the First 
Amendment, the United States is often considered to have the freest press in the world. However 
in a market economy the power of money may cause a virtual censorship. Most publications 
depend on subscriptions and advertisers. Readers must like the content and advertisers may 
cancel their accounts if the content challenges their product.195
 American tobacco companies have enormous advertising power. In 1994 they spent over 
$5 billion; that is $75 for each adult smoker in the USA.196 The fact that Congress banned 
cigarette advertising on radio and TV in 1969, resulted in more tobacco ads in the printed 
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press.197 There is every indication that this increasing number of tobacco ads affected the way 
magazines covered smoking. A 1978 survey by R.C. Smith revealed that cigarette ads in 
magazines had doubled in the seven years that had passed since the broadcast ban, and that 
magazines which accepted cigarette advertising failed to write about cigarettes.198  
 Between 1950 and 1969, Time, US News and World Report, and Newsweek printed 210 
articles about cigarettes. Between 1970 and 1986 the three weeklies printed only 64 articles about 
tobacco and cigarettes. Most of the articles were concerned with business and politics. The three 
magazines omitted smoking from most articles about cancer and heart disease. In November 
1983, for instance, Newsweek included a 16-page health supplement written by the American 
Medical Association. The original manuscript had included information about the addictive 
nature of tobacco, but Newsweek refused to mention smoking. That issue of Newsweek carried 
16 pages of cigarette ads.199
 This disturbing pattern was also demonstrated in the 1990s. A 1992 study published in the 
New England Journal of Medicine found that magazines which refused cigarette ads were 40% 
more likely to print articles on smoking hazards. Similarly, in 1996, Staff writer Derick Z. 
Jackson of Today’s Boston Globe, searched popular magazines for articles on health and found 
that magazines which accepted tobacco ads did not write derogatory articles about tobacco.200
  Tobacco advertisements do not only prevent publishers from printing articles that take up 
the dangers of smoking. A 1994 survey conducted by University of Washington professor Steven 
Bishofsky found that magazines fear losing cigarette advertisement if they print anti-tobacco ads. 
Among the magazines included in the survey as much as 93 percent of the publications that were 
carrying tobacco ads, said that they were concerned with how tobacco companies would react if 
they printed anti-smoking statements. 50% percent of the magazines which were carrying ads for 
tobacco industry subsidiaries feared how the parent companies would react upon anti-smoking 
ads and articles. 201
 An article by Jan Ferris in the January/February 1994 issue of Columbia Journalism 
Review reports of the California Department of Health Services' attempt to put an ad in the 
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magazine Essence. Essence was targeted due to its many black female readers. In California one 
in four of black women smoke, compared to one of five in the entire female population. The ad 
that the anti-smoking agency wanted to place in Essence included the photo of three black singers 
all dead of tobacco-related illnesses. The ad was accompanied by following text: "Cigarettes 
made them history."202
The California Department of Health services may have hoped to cooperate well with the 
magazine's senior editor for health, Linda Villarosa. She had once published a critical article on 
publishers and tobacco issues in the Harvard Public Health Review ("Caution: Tobacco Ads May 
Be Hazardous to your Editorial Freedom".)  Despite this, Essence showed extreme reluctance to 
print the ad. After having pointed to lack of space, the magazine characterized the ad as 
controversial. It was never printed. Jan Ferris also reports of how a group called Stop Teenage 
Addiction to Tobacco and Massachusetts health officials tried to place an ad in some east coast 
newspapers. The ad featured a photo of three publishers; S.I. Newhouse, Rupert Murdoch. 
Lawrence Tisch (president of CBC and owner of Lorillard Tobacco), Henry Kravis (R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco), and Michael Miles (chairman of Philip Morris). The copy of the ad read:  
"Meet five of America's richest drug pushers." The ad was accepted by The Washington Post and 
the Patent Reader, but it was rejected by The New York Times, the New York's Jewish Week and 
several suburban newspapers.203  
 In 1980, the independent liberal magazine Mother Jones considered printing a series of 
articles about smoking and cancer. The magazine accepted tobacco advertisement at the time and 
was concerned about possible economic consequences of printing the article. To its credit, 
Mother Jones decided to publish the series, and furious tobacco companies immediately 
withdrew their advertising. In the years to come, a Mother Jones free from tobacco ads was to 
produce a large number of hard-hitting exposés about the tobacco industry. I am very much 
obliged to the decision Mother Jones made in 1980. Many of these articles are important sources 
for my theses. 
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Fighting the media through the Court system 
The huge financial resources of the tobacco industry enable it to file lawsuits against mass media 
which print articles and broadcast exposes that could be a threat to the industry. This juridical 
power may lead to censorship in the media. A classic example is the suppression of "death in the 
west--the Marlboro story", a documentary made for Thames Television by Pete Taylor and 
Martin Smith in 1976. The program contrasted the suffering of six American cowboys who were 
dying of smoking-related illnesses, with the strong and healthy cowboys of the Marlboro Country 
Commercials. Claiming that the dying men were not cowboys and that the company had been 
tricked to permit its commercials in a film that depicted smoking in a negative way, Philip Morris 
successfully used the courts to bar the distribution of the film. Six years later a copy was sent 
anonymously to Stanton Glantz, professor of medicine of the University of California, and the 
film was eventually aired.204
 Youth smoking was a hotly debated theme in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The fight 
against increasing smoking rates among young people was to be a central part of President 
Clinton's anti-smoking commitment. Tobacco companies were often accused of targeting young 
people in their advertising campaigns. Such assertions were vigorously fought back by the 
tobacco industry. Some reporters experienced how fatal it could be to make errors when 
criticizing tobacco companies. In 1988, reporter Walt Jacobson and CBS Chicago affiliate 
WBBM-TV lost a $ 3 million libel suit brought by Brown & Williamson for having claimed that 
the tobacco company had an advertising strategy aimed at enticing children to smoke. The 
December 11, 1991, issue of the journal of the American Medical Association included two 
articles about the effect R.J. Reynolds's "Joe Camel" cartoon advertisements had on children. The 
tobacco company subpoenaed the authors of the articles, Joseph DiFranza and Paul Fisher, for 
the records of their research. The company also wanted the names of the children that had 
participated in the studies of the Journal of the American Medical Association. The fact that the 
claim of the tobacco company held up in a Massachusetts court, disturbed many in the research 
community. Many researchers feared that the decision would set a precedent that would prevent 
researchers from giving subjects confidentiality. Joseph DiFranza, M.D, an associate professor of 
family and community at the University of Massachusetts at Fitchburg, had to give his records to 
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the tobacco company. Then R.J Reynolds launched a public-relations attack on DiFranza, arguing 
that he had manipulated data to support his bias. Tobacco industry allies in the media leveled 
severe criticism at DiFranza and the Journal of the American Medical Association. According to 
DiFranza, R.J. Reynolds wished to create so much doubt about the JAMA studies that the Federal 
Trade Commission could justify not banning the Joe Camel  advertisements.205. 
 The author of the other article, Paul Fisher, M.D., editor of the Journal of Family Practice, 
won two court decisions in Georgia to protect the confidentiality of his records. Then the tobacco 
company asked the Medical College of Georgia, where Fischer was professor of family medicine, 
to turn to over Fischer's records. When the Medical School sided with Reynolds, Fischer decided 
to resign and fight the school and the tobacco company in court. 206
 On February 28 and March 7, 1994, ABC News aired a documentary which claimed that 
the tobacco companies were "spiking" their cigarettes with extraneous nicotine in order to keep 
their customers hooked. A few days before the broadcast of the program, Food and Drug 
Administration commissioner David Kessler had declared that the tobacco industry appeared to 
manipulate nicotine levels in cigarettes and that nicotine therefore might be regulated as a drug. 
Considering that Kessler had the support of President Clinton, there was a risk that ABC's 
"spiking charges" would lead to stricter regulation of the tobacco companies. Thus, it was 
extremely important for the tobacco industry to reject the allegations of the ABC documentary. 
17 days after the airing of the program, Philip Morris filed a $10 billion suit against ABC News 
in the circuit court for the city of Richmond, Virginia. Eleven month later, R.J.Reynolds also 
sued the News Company. For sixteen months ABC defended the newsmagazine in court, at the 
cost of several million dollars. ABC's trial lawyers were expecting a victory. Most journalists 
were stunned when ABC agreed to apologize to Philip Morris and to pay the tobacco company's 
legal fees.207
 Why did ABC News cave in to Philip Morris? Some commentaries claimed that ABC's 
cost-conscious corporate parent, Capital Cities chose to settle the case because of the company's 
forthcoming incorporation in the Disney entertainment empire. ABC may also have feared that 
procedural rulings could have forced a revelation of its news gathering and editing practices. 
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Even if such a disclosure would not have uncovered anything unlawful, it might have very 
embarrassing for the news company. It is also interesting to note that a syndicated column by Jeff 
Cohen and Norman Soloman claimed that Philip Morris executives had threatened to withdraw 
their $100-million Miller and Kraft advertising from the news network.208
 Some newspeople at ABC claimed that the 10 billion lawsuit against the company had a 
chilling effect. The very same day that Philip Morris sued, the network decided not to air a 
critical expose about the tobacco industry's marketing strategies. Philip Morris was prominently 
referred to in the program, which had cost ABC $500,000. When it became public that ABC had 
shelved a tobacco documentary by Emmy-Award winning producers Martin and Frank Koughan, 
ABC executive Vice President Paul Friedman denied that the pending 10 billion lawsuit had 
anything to do with the suppression of the tape. He claimed that the documentary was a "boring" 
rehash. However, some of the people who had seen the documentary had found it compelling.209
 The "censored" tape was eventually leaked to the press. A transcript of the program, 
which was published by Mother Jones in 1996, shows that Martin and Frank had described how 
R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris were trying to hook young smokers. The program asserted that 
"Joe Camel", R.J. Reynolds's cartoon figure, had caused an immense increase in smoking rates 
among young people. Philip Morris tried to meet this competition with "The Marlboro Adventure 
Team," which was a fleet of Marlboro vans crossing the USA while distributing free gifts to 
smokers. (To get a Kayak raft, you had to smoke 7,200 cigarettes!) The documentary also 
brought into focus the smokers rights groups which emerged after the Environmental Protection 
Agency had found cigarette smoking harmful to non-smokers. These groups had been staged by 
the tobacco industry, and the group members had been instructed to hide this. The Mother Jones 
transcript also revealed the disgust President Reagan's anti-smoking Surgeon General Everett 
Koop felt after learning of a secret memo where Reagan promised R.J. Reynolds not to cause any 
trouble for the tobacco industry. Koop also explained how Reagan's trade representatives 
threatened many Asian countries to open their markets for American cigarettes. According to 
Mother Jones, much of the information on the tape had been confirmed by whistle-blowers 
between 1994 and 1995. The magazine also asserted that Reagan's assurance to the tobacco 
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companies and the description of how the Reagan administration had pushed cigarettes on Asian 
countries were newsbreaks even in 1996.210
 The 1992 US Supreme Court decision in Rose Cipollone's suit against three tobacco 
companies had ruled that plaintiffs could sue cigarette companies for breaking their duty not to 
deceive the public if plaintiffs could prove that the tobacco makers had lied or intentionally 
hidden the dangers of smoking.211 Consequently, it was important for the tobacco industry to 
prevent that information which proved such as deceit was being made public. With an anti-
smoking president in the White House, the industry also had good reason to fear a federal 
lawsuit. 
 In 1995, the tobacco company Brown & Williamson threatened CBS with a 15 billion 
lawsuit if the news company aired an interview with Jeffrey Wigand, a former B&W executive. 
Wigand, who had a doctorate in endocrinology and biochemistry, had been the vice-president of 
scientific research of Brown and Williamson. The tobacco company had reportedly engaged 
Wigand in order to develop a less harmful cigarette, and according to his lawyer, Wigand had 
been fired when B&W decide to suppress his research. In 1994 Wigand was hired as a consultant 
for a CBS sixty minutes documentary by CBS veteran Lowell Bergman about research on a "fire-
safe cigarette". Bergman's exposé alleged that Philip Morris had developed a cigarette that was 
less likely to cause fires, only to bury the project for fear of lawsuits stemming from the period 
when cigarettes were not "fire safe". In order to avoid this research from becoming public, the 
tobacco company labeled the "fire free cigarettes" files as an attorney-client product.212
 One month after the airing of the documentary, Wigand informed Bergman that he had 
been threatened with death if he did not stay off the tobacco industry. Bergman then decided to 
do research on Brown & Williamson which was under intense fire in this period due to the secret 
company documents that had been sent anonymously to the University of California. After long 
hesitation, Wizard agreed to be interviewed about his experiences at Brown and Williamson. 
Before leaving B&W, Wigand had signed a non-disclosure agreement with the tobacco company. 
Claiming that CBS had encouraged Wigand to break his agreement, Brown & Williamson 
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threatened to sue CBS for "tortuous interference". The CBS News management might have been 
chilled by the ABC-Philip Morris controversy when it decided to cancel the 60-minute interview 
with Wigand. However, someone in the news company leaked a transcript of the interview to the 
New York Daily News, which quoted Wigand's main accusation against Brown & Williamson. 
Wigand had said that the tobacco company had suppressed research on a safer cigarette and used 
an additive in pipe tobacco, which the company knew had caused cancer in lab animal. Wigand 
had also asserted that an executive from Brown & Williamson had committed perjury when 
testifying in congressional hearing that nicotine is not addictive. Several newspapers criticized 
CBS for scuttling away from the interview. Many legal experts claimed that "the tortuous 
interference" charge did not imply any legal threat since the First Amendment would have 
protected the disclosure of the interview.213
 The fact that at that time CBS was on the hands of Lawrence Tisch, the owner of Lorillard 
Tobacco, may also have influenced the CBS management to suppress the Wigand interview. This 
aspect of the CBS "60 minutes Cave-in" will therefore be dealt with under "Tobacco and Media 
entwined".214
 
Media and Tobacco Entwined 
There are many examples of very close ties between the media and the tobacco industry. The 
business synergy between Philip Morris and Rupert Murdoch's media empire deserves closer 
attention. In the following I will make an attempt to uncover this symbiotic relationship between 
the tobacco giant and the media mogul. Tobacco advertisement is an important element in the 
close ties between Rupert Murdoch's media and Philip Morris. Murdoch is the owner of the News 
Corp, one of the most powerful media and entertainment companies in the world. His American 
possessions include the Weekly Standard, the New York Post, and Fox Broadcasting. TV Guide, 
Harper Collins book publishers, and Twenty Century Fox are also in the hands of the media 
giant. Murdoch's publications make enormous profits from cigarette ads. In additions, there is a 
close relationship between Fox Broadcasting and Philip Morris subsidiary Miller Brewing Co. In 
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1997 the brewery increased its advertising account with Fox to $ 75 million per year for sports 
and prime-time programs.215
 Murdoch was also appointed to the Board of Philip Morris in 1989. In 1997 he also joined 
the board of the heavily tobacco-funded Cato Institute, a think tank known for its pro-tobacco 
stance. This appointment was hardly commented on in the media. The synergy between Philip 
Morris and Murdoch News Corporation does not end here. In 1998, Geoffrey C. Bible, chairman 
of Philip Morris, was named a director of Murdochs's News Corp. It is also worth mentioning 
that former chief executive of Philip Morris, Hamish Maxwell, had served on the board of the 
News Corporation until early 1998. 
 Articles about business synergy often make front-page news, but the appointment of Bible 
got scant news coverage. The Wall Street Journal announced the appointment of Bible with four 
sentences in the second news sections and Murdoch's own New York Post printed a slightly more 
hailing article on page 32. Anti-tobacco activist Cliff Douglas sent the Journal item to a huge 
number of reporters, urging them to take a closer look at the story. The only journalist who cared 
to pay attention to the appointment of Bible was Chip Jones, a tobacco reporter at the Richmond 
Times Dispatch (Va.).216 Chip Jones drew attention to the fact that Bibles's entry into the board 
of news Corp had vexed the anti-smoking lobby. Jones' article quoted a statement by William 
Novelli, president of the Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids in Washington. Among other things, 
Novelli questioned the ethics of voting a tobacco executive onto the board of a company that has 
access to children both through television and film (Fox Broadcasting and 20th Century Fox). 
Chip Jones also cited anti-tobacco activist Clifford Douglas, the initiator of the article. Douglas 
feared that the Philip Morris-News Corp link would give the tobacco industry a fabulous 
opportunity for lobbying through Murdoch's media empire.217
 A 1985 memo from Philip Morris, unearthed by Mother Jones Magazine in 1998, 
revealed the tobacco company's strategy for a tobacco-friendly news coverage. The secret 
document, which was written by former Philip Morris chief executive Hamish Maxwell., outlined 
a strategy to sway public opinion in favor of Philip Morris by means of the company's clout with 
the media. 
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 The sixth point I want to make is that we are not using our very considerable clout with 
the media. A number of media proprietors that I have spoken to are sympathetic to our position. 
Rupert Murdoch and Malcolm Forbes are two good examples. The media like the money they 
make from our advertisements and they are an ally that we can and should exploit. 218
 
 In an appendix to the memo another Philip Morris executive used Murdoch as the model 
for tobacco-media relations: 
 
 Another area we intend to exploit more fully is the ad agencies and media proprietors. We 
have already been helped a great deal by the agencies in Hong Kong for example in our efforts to 
resist advertising restrictions. As regards the media, we plan to build similar relationships to 
those we now have with Murdoch's News Limited with other newspapers proprietors. Murdoch's 
papers rarely publish anti-smokers articles these days.219
 
 The tobacco industry was eager to change the anti-smoking fervor of the early 1990s. 
Philip Morris even considered buying The Atlantic Monthly and several other media outlets. 
According to an internal Philip Morris document, the aim was to "influence the public policy 
agenda and the information flow to the populace." 220
 During the CBS 60 minutes controversy, some journalists asserted that CBS had caved in 
to Brown & Williamson because its chairman at the time, Laurence Tisch, was also a owner of 
Lorillard Tobacco. Andrew Tisch was one of the tobacco executives who had sworn before 
Congress that that tobacco was not addictive. He was under investigation for having committed 
perjury in those hearings. Jeffrey Wigand had been subpoenaed as a witness in that investigation. 
Laurence Tisch was also about to sell CBS to Westinghouse. A pending lawsuit would definitely 
have decreased the market value of the news company. Tisch claimed that he had not known 
anything about the cancellation of the Wigand interview until after the decision was made. 
However, the executives and internal lawyers who decided not to broadcast the interview must 
have been concerned about how Tisch would have reacted if they aired a program that might 
have helped sending his son to jail, in addition to jeopardizing two important business deals.221
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 Even if CBS produced critical exposés about the tobacco industry while owned by Tisch, 
the company was also accused of siding with the tobacco lobby. In 1994, Jeff Cohen and Norman 
Salomon pointed to how "America Tonight", the prime time CBS news magazine, had held 
Canada's taxes up to ridicule. The news segment had asserted that smoking had increased its 
revenues because of large-scale smuggling from the USA. According to Cohen and Soloman, 
smoking in Canada had decreased with 40 % since 1982, the year when cigarette taxes started 
increasing in Canada. They also asserted that Cigarette tax revenues had risen from 2.16 billion 
Canadian dollars to 6.3 in 1993. Cohen and Soloman also pointed to how the Canadian tobacco 
industry had contributed to the smuggling by overexporting cigarettes to the USA. The two 
reporters raised the question of whether cigarette taxes were too low in the USA. The views 
mentioned above were not aired in the program, since no proponents of higher taxes on cigarettes 
appeared on the broadcast. Rod Stanler, the on-air expert of the program was presented as a 
former top officer of the Canadian police. He turned out to be paid consultant on cigarette 
smuggling for a firm that had been hired by the Canadian Tobacco Manufactures Council. 
President Clinton was a proponent of raising cigarette taxes in the USA. The America Tonight 
news segment must have had considerable propaganda value for the American tobacco 
industry.222
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SUMMARY OF THE CLINTON SCANDALS AND THE IMPEACHMENT 
PROCESS. 
 
Throughout his presidency Bill Clinton was dogged by allegations of wrongdoing.223 In early 
1994 Robert B. Fiske was appointed as a special counsel to investigate the Clintons’ involvement 
in a failed Arkansas real estate deal 14 years back in time. Fiske’s Whitewater investigation 
included an inquiry into the 1993 firing of seven members of the White House travel office, often 
called "Travelgate". In May 1994 Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, charged the 
president with sexual harassment. Kenneth Starr replaced Fiske as the lead Whitewater 
investigator in August 1994. Two years later Starr started looking into “Filegate”, that is the 1993 
and 1994 White House request for FBI files on prominent Republicans. In 1998 Kenneth Starr 
expanded his inquiry to include President Clinton’s alleged relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 
Starr’s findings in the Lewinsky case was to form the basis of an impeachment process against 
the President. 
 
The Whitewater Scandal 
I will now give a brief account of the elements of the Whitewater Scandal that find most relevant 
to the Clintons and of the central questions that have been raised by the investigators. In 1978 
Bill Clinton and his wife entered into partnership with James and Susan McDougal in order to 
buy 220 acres of riverfront land. Their intention was to build vacation homes, and the two 
couples soon formed the White Water Development Corp. McDougal also owned a small savings 
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and loan company called Madison Guaranty. In 1986 he was removed as Madison Guaranty’s 
president by federal regulators due to improper business practices. Madison Guaranty collapsed a 
few years later, and the partnership between the McDougals and the Clintons dissolved. Bill 
Clinton and his wife had lost approximately $ 40,000. 
In 1985 McDougal had hired the Rose Law Firm, where Hillary Clinton was a partner, to 
do legal work for his ailing savings and loan. Hillary Clinton and an other lawyer from the Rose 
Law Firm tried to recapitalize Madison Guaranty. An important element of the Whitewater 
investigation was whether Hillary Clinton had or tried to hide the billing records which showed 
the extent of legal work that she had done for Madison Guaranty. After having been missing and 
under subpoena for two years, Hillary Clinton’s billing records suddenly turned up in the White 
House residence book room. 
In 1986 Susan McDougal had borrowed $ 300,000 from a business organisation owned by 
David Hale. Some of the loan went into the Whitewater Development Corp. The Small Business 
Administration provided Hale's company with funds that he was to lend to disadvantaged 
business owners. In 1996 David Hale testified that Bill Clinton had pressured him to make the 
fraudulent loan to Susan McDougal. Shortly after, Clinton testified on videotape for more than 
four hours. The president denied Hale's accusation. Starr raised the question of whether Bill 
Clifton had lied under sworn testimony when he denied any knowledge of the fraudulent loan to 
MacDouglas. Clinton's supporters, however, asked themselves whether key witness David Hale 
had received thousands of dollars from Clinton's enemies.  
In July 1993 Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster was found dead in a park in 
Washington, D.C. The Police decided that his death was a suicide. However, due to a series of 
speculations about Foster’s death, both Fiske and Starr included it in their investigations. One 
month before his death Foster had been filing three years of delinquent Whitewater corporate tax 
returns. It was often suggested that there was a link between Foster's death and his knowledge of 
the developing scandal. Some people, among others Fosters secretary Linda Tripp, believed that 
Foster had been murdered. 
In March 1994 Webster L. Hubbel resigned as associate attorney general after having 
come under scrutiny by the Whitewater investigators. Hubbell and Hillary Clinton had been 
partners at the Rose Law Firm. Shortly after Hubbell’s resignation, friends of Clintons’ and 
Democratic Party supporters allegedly paid Hubbell more than $ 700,000. Kenneth Starr and his 
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associates wanted to learn whether the White House had arranged payments to Hubbell in order 
to buy his silence about things he might have learnt while he and Hillary Clinton were partners at 
the Rose Law Firm. Hubbell was later convicted of fraud. 
In May 1996 the McDougals were also convicted of almost all the fraud and conspiracy 
charges which Kenneth Starr had accused them of 10 months earlier and were later given heavy 
prison sentences. In September the same year Susan McDougal refused to testify in front of a 
grand jury and went to jail for contempt of court. Starr's probe was to show whether the White 
House had pressured the McDougals not to talk during their fraud trial. 
 
Travelgate and Filegate 
The Fiske and Starr probes were to embrace the 1993 firing of seven employees of the White 
House travel office. The firing was followed by an FBI investigation of the employees. It was 
often claimed that the seven workers had been dismissed in order to make room for some of 
Clinton’s friends, and the White House was also accused of pressuring the FBI to investigate the 
travel office employees. The 1993 and 1994 collection of hundreds of FBI files on prominent 
Republicans also became a part of the Whitewater investigation. In 1996 The White House 
admitted that those reports had been wrongly collected, and Director of Personnel Security Craig 
Livingstone later took the responsibility for the illegal collection. 
During the first day of impeachment hearings Kenneth Starr cleared Clinton in relation to 
"Travelgate" and "Filegate". He also said that his office had drafted an impeachment referral 
based on Whitewater, but had decided not to send because of insufficient evidence. To most 
people’s satisfaction Starr also came to the conclusion that Foster's death had been a suicide. 
Starr's long and expensive investigation concerning Clinton's involvement in Whitewater, 
Filegate, and Travelgate had ended in nothing. It was to be the Paula Jones’ sexual harassment 
case, however, that indirectly was to give Starr a breakthrough. 
 
The Paula Jones Case 
In May 1994, Paula Jones charged the President with sexual harassment for allegedly having 
propositioned her in a Little Rock hotel room three years before, and she demanded $700,000 in 
damages. Clinton and his lawyers responded with attempts to delay the lawsuit. In late 1994, US 
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District Judge Susan Webber ruled that the trial could not take place as long as Clinton was in 
office. However, in January 1996 a three-judge US appeals Court panel overruled her judgment, 
and the lawsuit could go on. Clinton appealed to the Supreme Court, and the case was put on 
hold until the 1996 November election.  
After Clinton's re-election, however, The Supreme Court decided that the Paula Jones 
case could proceed. In late 1997, an anonymous call had informed Jones’ lawyers of Clinton's 
alleged relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Shortly thereafter Lewinsky was 
subpoenaed by Jones’ lawyers. In early January 1998, in a sworn affidavit, she denied having had 
an affair with Clinton in a sworn affidavit. President Clinton also strongly denied having  had an 
affair with Lewinsky when he was questioned under oath by Paula Jones’ lawyers in mid-
January. Kenneth Starr had expanded his investigation to include the question whether Clinton 
had encouraged Lewinsky to lie about her alleged affair with the president, Judge Susan Webber 
excluded Lewinsky's deposition as evidence in the Paula Jones case. 
In April 1998  Webber dismissed the Paula Jones’ sexual harassment suit against 
President Clinton, claiming that Jones’ complaint even if true, would not be a violation of law, a 
decision that was appealed by Jones’ lawyers. In November President Clinton settled the Paula 
Jones case in an out of court settlement, agreeing to pay Jones $ 850,000 while admitting 
nothing. 
 
The Lewinsky Scandal 
In 1995 President Clinton allegedly became involved with Monica Lewinsky in a sexual 
relationship. Lewinsky assured Clinton that she had not told anybody about their encounters; 
however, she confided her trysts with Clinton in several people, among others to Pentagon 
employee Linda Tripp. Subpoenaed in the Paula Jones case, however, Lewinsky denied having 
had an affair with Clinton. Shortly afterwards Linda Tripp contacted Starr's office and handed 
over 20 hours of taped conversations with Lewinsky. The following day Linda Tripp met with 
Lewinsky, and with FBI assistance she taped their conversation. On January 16, Kenneth Starr 
expanded his probe to include the question whether President Clinton had encouraged Lewinsky 
to lie about their relationship. However, President Clinton testifying under oath in the Paula 
Jones case, denied having had a sexual relationship with the young White House intern. 
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After having reached a tentative immunity deal with Kenneth Starr, Monica Lewinsky 
began testifying before Starr's jury on August 6. President Clinton gave testimony before the 
Lewinsky grand jury a few days later, and in a televised address to the nation the same evening 
he admitted having had an inappropriate relationship with Lewinsky, but he denied having 
encouraged Lewinsky to lie about it. 
 
The Impeachment process 
In September 1998 Kenneth Starr sent his report of possible impeachable offenses by President 
Clinton to Congress. One month later, the House approved an impeachment inquiry of the 
President by a vote of 258 -176. 31 Democrats voted yes. At the end of the year the White House 
presented a defense report to the House Judiciary Committee, giving reasons why Starr's charges 
against President Clinton were unjustified. Shortly after the House Judiciary Committee 
dismissed censure as an option for punishment and unveiled four articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton. Two articles alleged that he had lied in the Paula Jones case and in his 
testimony before Ken Starr's grand jury. The other articles charged that he had abused the powers 
of his office and obstructed justice in the Monica Lewinsky affair. The House of Representatives 
approved two articles of impeachment against the President on December 19th. An impeachment 
trial of the President was opened in the Senate in January 1999.  However, polls showed that 
most Americans disapproved of such a trial.  At the end of the month the senators approved a 
proposal to allow House managers to call witnesses. Consequently, Monica Lewinsky was 
questioned under oath by Republican House managers. Finally, on February 12 the Senate 
acquitted President Clinton on both impeachment charges. 
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THE CLINTON SCANDALS AND THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
 
The Appointment of Kenneth Starr 
The law authorising the job of independent counsel, which was passed in 1978 because of the 
Watergate scandal, expired in 1992. President Clinton wished to re-authorize the law, but the 
Republicans, who were angry over an independent counsel investigation of the Iran-Contra 
Scandal during the Reagan presidency, thwarted its re-authorisation.224 Consequently, President 
Clinton asked Attorney General Janet Reno to name a special counsel on her own authority to 
look into the Whitewater affair. As already mentioned, Reno chose moderate Republican Robert 
B. Fiske, Jr. The appointment was received well by many prominent Republicans. Senator 
Alfonse M. D’ Amato called him “one of the most honourable and skilled lawyers anywhere.”225 
Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole said that he felt Fiske was “extremely well-qualified.” 
However, Dole also pointed out that some of the conservative Republicans were skeptical of 
Fiske. It is interesting to note that the Washington Legal Foundation, where Kenneth Starr sits on 
the Board, criticized Fiske's liberal ties before he was appointed Whitewater special counsel. The 
Washington Legal Foundation is partly funded by the tobacco industry and partly by the 
conservative John M. Olin Foundation.226 The Republicans eventually consented to the re-
authorization of the of independent counsel law and gave a three-judge panel of the US Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Washington, D.C the power of appointment. Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist was given the authority to choose the panel’s members. According to Salon, 
"Rehnquist moved a piece on the Washington chessboard that was scarcely noticed at the time, 
but which would have the most profound implications"227: He renamed David Sentelle, a 
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Republican political activist with tobacco connections to be the chairman of the panel.228 
(Chosen by Renhquist in 1992 to replace moderate Republican R.George McKinnan as the head 
of the  three-judge panel which authorizes special prosecutors in 1992, Sentelle had been 
instrumental in turning down the conviction of Oliver North).229 Majority Leader Bob Dole had 
criticized Fiske for inadequate aggressiveness, and Senator Launch Faircloth had been worrying 
about the fact that Fiske had ruled that Vince Foster's death was a suicide. Nevertheless, when 
Reno asked the three-judge panel to give its support to Fiske, this was almost a pro forma 
request. 230 Surprisingly the three-judge panel refused to re-appoint Fiske, referring to a possible 
conflict of interest because he had been appointed by Clinton's attorney general, and appointed 
Kenneth Starr as Fiske's successor.231  
Sentelle had lunch with conservative Republican senators Jesse Helms and Launch 
Faircloth shortly before the appointment of Kenneth Starr. Faircloth and Helms also have tobacco 
connections; they ranked second and third respectively among the top tobacco recipients in the 
US Senate 1991-1996.232 Fiske had not been able to find any wrongdoing by the Clintons in the 
Arkansas deal, and it has often been alleged that during their lunch the three North Carolinian 
friends decided to choose a sterner prosecutor. 233 Sentelle has declared that he does not think he 
discussed the Whitewater investigation with Helms and Faircloth during their lunch, but that he 
cannot be absolutely sure.234
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Kenneth Starr and the Tobacco Industry 
The controversy over Kenneth Starr reported above was not confined to the way he was 
appointed. Both Clinton supporters and many independent critics claimed that his investigation 
was partial and that he had a number of conflicts of interest. However, defenders of Kenneth 
Starr stressed that he was a widely respected lawyer who had been on Reno’s short list of 
candidates when she chose Fiske.235
Public defender Francis T. Mandanici of Bridgeport, Ct., is a fierce critic of Kenneth 
Starr.236 He filed a motion with the US District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in 
1996, asking it to suspend or discipline Starr for misconduct. I think Mandanici's objections to 
Starr are representative for the general criticism of Kenneth Starr. Among other things Mr. 
Mandancini points to  “his association with the Bush administration, where he lost his job and a 
potential Supreme Court appointment upon Clinton's victory in 1992; his efforts to intervene on 
behalf of Paula Jones against Clinton in her sexual harassment suit; his campaign gifts of $1,750 
to Clinton's Republican presidential foes last year; his representation of the Republican National 
Committee and conservative foundations and tobacco interests opposing Clinton; his use of the 
independent prosecutor’s office to bludgeon federal officials who had sued his law firm for 
aiding savings and loan fraud.”237
One of Mandancini's objections to Starr was that he had worked for the tobacco industry. 
In the following I will give a brief account of Kenneth Starr's connection with the tobacco 
industry. Unlike his predecessor Robert B. Fiske, Starr chose to continue his private practice at 
the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis after he was named as independent prosecutor. He represented 
the tobacco company Brown & Williamsen in a lawsuit against Henry A. and Ron Wyder in 
1995.238 These two Democratic congressmen had revealed that Brown & Williamson had known 
for 30 years that nicotine was addictive. However, the tobacco company had not made that 
information available to the public. Health Secretary in the Carter Administration A. Califano 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
234 Ibid. 
235 “Pathway to Peril , Chapter 3 , Counsel with Conservative, Devout Roots.” Los Angeles Times  
 (31 Jan 1999) : 5 pp. Online. Internet. 8 Jun. 1999. Available: 
http://www.latimes.com/HOME/NEWS/REPORTS/SCANDAL/PATHWAY/chapter3.htm 
236 Dumas, Ernest. “Opinion: Time to probe Kenneth Starr”. News & Politics (20 Sept. 1996): 3 pp. Online. Internet. 
10 Sept. 1999 Available: 
htt://www.arktimes.com/white65.htm 
237 Ibid 
238 Sheer ,Robert. “Kenneth Starr and the tobacco connection”(21 July 1996) Online. Internet. 26 Nov. 1999 
 80
testified that if that information had been known in 1979, the Surgeon General would have found 
cigarettes addictive, and consequently the government would have taken steps to regulate them. 
Cigarettes were not ruled addictive by the Surgeon General until 1988. Later the same year 
Brown & Williamson, represented by Starr, argued unsuccessfully before an appellate court that 
the attorney client privilege had been violated in as much as internal company documents had 
been leaked by a paralegal employee. 
Kenneth Starr's connection to the tobacco industry was topic for discussion in a 1996 
debate led by J.L.Lewis between Martin Meehan, a Massachusetts prosecutor turned senator, and 
Mark Tuohey, formerly Starr’s chief deputy counsel in the Whitewater investigation. Martin T. 
Meehan found it highly improper that Kenneth Starr was Brown & Williamson's Counsel of 
Record in The Castano suit, a major class-action lawsuit, making statements on behalf on his 
client about the questioning of the addictive nature of nicotine at the same time that the Justice 
Department had expanded the major investigation of the tobacco companies. However, former 
Starr aide Mark H. Tuohey did not see this as a conflict of interests. He maintained that Starr did 
not have to give up his private practice as long as he conducted his investigation with objectivity 
and non-partisanship.239
 
The Paula Jones Case and Tobacco Interests 
The Paula Jones case was triggered by stories in the Los Angeles Times, and the conservative 
American Spectator reported allegations that Governor Clinton had used state troopers to help 
him score with young women. There was a mention of a young women who had spent an 
intimate hour with Clinton at the Excelsior Hotel. When Paula Jones learned of the article, she 
contacted a Little Rock attorney, David M. Traylor, whose first move was to inform Clinton 
through a local Democratic Party leader that Jones wanted to refute the story. Believing that 
Jones and Clinton could appear in public as allies, Trayler simply asked for a private apology 
from Clinton and $5,000 to cover his legal costs and a joint public statement from Jones and the 
President, condemning those who had published accounts of their hotel meeting.240 If Clinton 
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had accepted Traylor’s bid, there would not have been any Paula Jones case, and consequently 
President Clinton could not have been impeached on the basis of perjury. 
The fact that Traylor's private bid was refused, and that liberal quarters showed no 
interest in the case, made Traylor convinced that only Clinton's foes would take up Jones’ case. 
He settled on Washington lawyers Davis and Cammarata, who had handled conservative causes 
before. Davis and Cammarata were assisted by Richard Porter, Jerome Marcus, and George 
Conway III. Richard Porter, a former Quayle aide, had joined Kenneth Starr's firm, Kirkland & 
Ellis. George Conway III, the most successful and most profiled of the three, was a partner at 
New York's Wachell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. Conway reportedly made as much as $ 1 million a 
year defending tobacco companies (Conason & Lyons 117). In Southern California, Paula Jones 
had come under the wings of conservative activist Susan Carpenter-McMillan, and Davis and 
Cammarata were supported by the Rutherford Institute of Charlottesville, Virginia.241The 
conservative Landmark Legal Foundation also did work for Paula Jones. 
Miss Jones also received the support of the Independent Women’s Forum. This is a 
conservative organization heavily funded by ultra-right-winger Richard Mellon Scaife. One 
prominent member of the IWF, Melinda Sidak, was a lawyer for the Tobacco Institute (the 
cigarette industry’s main lobbying organization). In 1990 she asserted that smoking had not been 
shown to cause cancer or any other disease. IWF members such as Barbara Olson, Laura 
Ingraham and Whitney Adams were supporters of Kenneth Starr.242 Starr actually prepared a 
legal brief for Paula Jones on behalf of the IWF.243
A secret donation of $ 50,000 was transferred to the legal fund of Paula Jones in 1995. 
According to Salon Newsreel, the contribution came from the D.C-based Fund for a Living 
American Government. It is unclear who provided the money. FLAG's director, William 
Lehrfeld, has done legal work for the Heritage Foundation and the Washington Legal 
Foundation. 244 The two conservative organizations mentioned above are heavily funded by the 
tobacco industry.245
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 Impeachment and Tobacco Interests 
I will now examine whether tobacco interests may have influenced the impeachment drive in the 
House of Representatives. Many sources claim that House Majority Whip Tom DeLay (R-Texas) 
was instrumental in the decision to impeach President Clinton. A 1999 Salon article by Joe 
Conason maintains that DeLay filled the power vacuum that was left by Newt Gingrich and his 
successor Bob Livingston. Salon reports that Livingston seldom appeared in the media, while 
DeLay "blustered his way through the Sunday talk shows, promoting impeachment.” When he 
appeared on “Face the nation”, Rep. Peter King, a moderate New York Republican who pushed 
for censure, said that Clinton would not be impeached if Tom DeLay would allow a free 
conscience vote on whether or not there should be a censure motion. 246
According to Dr. Edwin Fisher at the Washington University in St. Louis, DeLay's 
motives for trying to oust the President have connection with the tobacco industry. Fisher reports 
that all four House Republican leaders had received tobacco political-action committee 
contributions during the last congressional cycle, and that Tom Delay was the biggest taker. 247 
DeLay's voting records were uniformly pro-tobacco.248
Republican Representative Bob Barr from Georgia was also one of the strongest 
proponents of a mode to impeach Clinton on issues ranging from Lewinsky to fund-raising and 
Whitewater. Barr had been closely allied with the National Rifle Association, but was also 
accused of ties to the tobacco industry. Barr had received ample campaign contributions from the 
tobacco sector and his voting record was uniformly pro-tobacco. Like Kenneth Starr, Jesse 
Helms, and Tom DeLay, Bob Barr was on the National Board of Advisors of the Washington 
Legal Foundation, which is financed by Big Tobacco and Richard Mellon Scaife.249
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CONCLUSION 
 
A number of facts spurred President Clinton to make a major confrontation with the American 
tobacco industry. Being in need of funding for his health care plan, Clinton proposed a tax on 
cigarettes, a move that immediately set the president on a collision course with tobacco firms. 
Contact with health groups during the preparation of the plan also called Clinton’s attention to 
health risks in connection with smoking. The president was also encouraged by revelations that 
tobacco companies had lied about the dangers of smoking, that it had deliberately tried to hook 
children and manipulated the nicotine levels in cigarettes.  
The fact that Vice-president Al Gore urged Clinton to combat the tobacco industry also 
had an important bearing on Clinton’s decision to take on tobacco firms. The anti-tobacco 
commitment of Food and Drug Administration commissioner David Kessler was also of 
immeasurable importance. Clinton’s endorsement of FDA’s classification of nicotine as a drug 
and of the FDA rules aimed at curbing youth smoking were Clinton’s most important steps 
against the tobacco industry during his first term. The fact that Kessler had advised Clinton to 
focus on youth smoking had provided Clinton with a political strategy in the tobacco issue. After 
having been assured by his pollster Dick Morris that it would cost him few votes, Clinton raised 
the tobacco issue in the 1996 presidential election. It was difficult for the Republican candidate 
Bob Dole, who was a recipient of large tobacco contributions, to sweep away the combat of 
youth smoking with anti-regulatory GOP rhetoric. Helped by Dole’s many clumsy remarks about 
smoking, Clinton managed to portray himself as a candidate who cared about young people’s 
health.  The tobacco issue had become an important Democratic public value. 
Clinton’s attempt to pass sweeping tobacco legislation in Congress and his attempt to let 
the FDA regulate tobacco both failed. The President therefore tried to make steps against the 
industry by means of executive orders and by using the court system. Clinton’s intense focus on 
the tobacco industry stained its reputation. The President’s commitment in the tobacco issue was 
founded on idealism as well as on pragmatism. Polls had convinced Clinton that he was not 
committing political suicide when he raised the tobacco issue in the 1996 presidential election. 
There were strong winds of anti-tobacco fervor in the mid-1990s and considerable changes in the 
electorate. The GOP had replaced the Democratic Party as the dominant party in the South. 
Furthermore, in the 1990s the Southern Democratic vote tended to be found in areas with high- 
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tech industries rather than in rural areas. A courageous Clinton understood that conditions most 
likely were the right for an anti-tobacco president. In my opinion, the 1996 presidential election 
revolutionized tobacco’s role in American politics. Before 1996, politicians who wished to take 
steps against the tobacco industry did not have the courage to do so for fear of losing votes. After 
1996, tobacco connections and a pro-tobacco stance tended to hurt politically. Inspired by the 
success of the Contract with America, the Democrats developed a national platform which called 
for tobacco legislation before the 1998 election. Democratic diversity in the tobacco case had 
developed into unity. 
The enormous wealth of the tobacco companies permitted them to strike back at Clinton 
in a number of ways. The ties between the Republican Party and the tobacco companies were 
strengthened during the Clinton presidency. By giving heavy financial support to organizations 
and think thanks which exerted influence on the GOP, the tobacco industry managed to portray 
regulation of tobacco as a violation of Republican ideology. In this period, the GOP became more 
and more dependent on the votes from the religious right. However, these newcomers in the 
Republican Party with their pro-life stance did at best turn a blind eye on the tobacco issue. 
Tobacco-growing states often were strongholds of the religious right, and a number of 
conservative members of Congress who represented religious groups were staunch allies of the 
tobacco industry. 
  Well aware of their tattered reputations the tobacco companies tried to fight tobacco 
regulations, making sure that the word tobacco was not even mentioned. The financial support of 
anti-tax groups which exerted influence in the GOP became very important in this respect. 
Contributions to the Republican Party and Republican members of Congress sky-rocketed in the 
mid-1990s. Studies showed that there was a high correlation between ample tobacco 
contributions to members of Congress and pro-tobacco votes cast in Congress. An army of 
tobacco lobbyists was also instrumental in persuading members of Congress to vote in favor of 
the tobacco industry. The fact that the enormous wealth of the tobacco industry contributed to its 
vast political clout can be seen as a purchase of influence and a weakening of democracy. The 
campaign finance reforms of the Feingold-McCain Act of 2002 can therefore be seen as a 
strengthening of democracy in the United States. 
The tobacco companies tried to sway public opinion by influencing and controlling the 
mass media. The industry launched expensive advertising campaigns designed to improve its 
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fringed reputation.  Heavy financial support to so-called neutral think thanks often resulted in 
media inserts which were favorable to the tobacco industry .Business synergy, tobacco-owned 
media-outlets, and the enormous advertising power of the tobacco industry also led to self-
censure of media companies. Studies show that publications dependent on tobacco advertisement 
often failed to print articles which were unfavorable to the tobacco companies. I find it 
disquieting that the tobacco companies provoked self-censure in the mass media. It suggests that 
freedom of speech in democracies can be impaired when business corporations become too 
powerful. The establishment of the internet made it easier to get anti-tobacco articles, reports 
from whistleblowers etc. to the public. However, the tobacco companies had another weapon, the 
courts. Scientists and TVstations alike were threatened with legal prosecution, a practice that 
probably had a preventive effect.  
Since research had ascertained the detrimental effects of smoking, it was no longer 
possible for the tobacco companies to claim the opposite. It was therefore of vital importance for 
the tobacco industry to draw attention away from health risks in connection with tobacco use. 
Smoking was instead presented as a civil liberty issue. Helped by their support to so-called 
neutral organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union, the tobacco companies portrayed 
regulation of tobacco as a violation of the freedom of American citizens. The curbing of 
advertisement aimed at minors was represented as a violation of freedom of speech. This strategy 
permeated both the political efforts and PR efforts of the tobacco companies.  
 Haunted by accusations of illegal behavior, President Clinton initiated the appointment of 
a special counsel to look into the Whitewater affair. This move turned out to be a serious mistake 
inasmuch as it eventually led to the appointment of Kenneth Starr. The fact that moderate 
Republican Robert Fiske, who had been appointed independent counsel in early 1994, did not 
find anything illicit on the Clintons probably led to his ousting. There is every indication that the 
replacement of Robert Fiske with Kenneth Starr was politically motivated and that tobacco 
interests were involved. The fact that Kenneth Starr continued defending tobacco firms while 
investigating an anti-tobacco president was a serious conflict of interest. Starr’s investigation 
seemed to be a fishing trip for possible wrongdoing rather than an investigation of illicit 
behavior. After years of investigation Starr was not able to prove that the Clintons had done 
anything illegal in the Whitewater affair. He also drew the conclusion that Vincent Foster’s death 
was a suicide. Fiske had concluded similarly years before. Starr finally got a nibble when he 
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discovered the relationship between the President and Monica Lewinsky. Starr was involved in 
the Paula Jones case, and I think there are indications that a perjury trap was deliberately set for 
Clinton when he was asked about his relationship with Lewinsky in the Paula Jones case. 
 Clinton’s denial under oath of having a sexual relationship with Lewinsky led to the 
impeachment process. American tobacco companies had an enormous clout in the Republican 
Party which pressed for impeachment of the president. House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, a 
recipient of vast tobacco contributions, was instrumental in omitting the possibility of censuring 
Clinton and in reviving the impeachment drive in Congress after the 1998 congressional 
elections.     
Resentment against the American tobacco industry grew in intensity after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. The absence of an external enemy may have made the Americans more aware of 
negative factors within their own country. In this respect, the American tobacco companies can 
be said to have replaced "the evil" empire in many Americans' minds. After having been under 
fire in the Clinton period, the tobacco companies must have drawn a sign of relief when George 
W.  Bush defeated the anti-smoking Al Gore. George W. Bush, who had not accepted campaign 
contributions from tobacco companies while he was governor in Texas, received ample tobacco 
contributions during his campaign for the presidency. When elected President, Bush appointed 
many top level aids who had been friendly towards the tobacco industry in the past, among others 
attorney general John Ashcroft. The Bush administration's reluctance to carry on the Justice 
Department's case against the tobacco companies may be indicative of tight links between the 
industry and George W. Bush. 
President Clinton’s anti-tobacco commitment was marked by political will, courage and 
strategic skills; all the same, he did not achieve much when it comes to tobacco legislation.  
Clinton’s general left turn, and unilateralism when preparing his health care plan probably led to 
the democratic debacle in the 1994 congressional elections. The prospects for sweeping tobacco 
legislation during Clinton’s second term would have been much brighter with a democratic 
majority in Congress. 
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